THE REALITY and EFFICACY OF DIVINE GRACE;

WITH THE

CERTAIN SUCCESS

OF

CHRIST's SUFFERINGS,

In Behalf of all who are finally saved.

CONSIDERED IN

A SERIES OF LETTERS

TO

The Rev. ANDREW FULLER:

Containing REMARKS upon the

OBSERVATIONS of the Rev. DAN TAYLOR,

on Mr. *Fuller's* Reply to *Philanthropos*.

By AGNOSTOS.

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N. B. Neither Mr. Fuller, nor any of his friends, had any purpoſe of writing a Reply to Mr. *Taylor's* xiii Letters, till about a year ago; when an anſwer being written to Mr. *Martin*, it was thought adviſeable that another ſhould be written to Mr. *Taylor*. Since that time the author has had various engagements, which frequently called off his attention from the preſent performance, otherwiſe it would have appeared much ſooner.

☞ The roman numerals in the margin refer to the *firſt* edition of Mr. *Taylor's* xiii Letters, and the figures to the *ſecond*.

LETTER I.

My dear friend,

YOU have lately been engaged in a religious controverſy, in which your original deſign was directed againſt what you conſidered as an abuſe of the doctrines of diſcriminating grace; but in executing this deſign, you have ſuſtained an attack from an oppoſite quarter. At this I am not much ſurprized, as the principles you maintain are equally repugnant to *Arminaniſm* as to *Pſeudo-calviniſm*.

I have carefully attended to this controverſy in all its parts, and muſt confeſs myſelf ſtill of opinion, that in the main, you have engaged on the ſide of truth; and that the arguments you have advanced have not yet been ſolidly anſwered.

Mr. *Dan Taylor*, who animadverted on your firſt publication, under the ſignature of *Philanthropos*, and to whoſe animadverſions you have written a *Reply*, has taken up his pen again. In addition to his firſt ix letters, he has written xiii more upon the ſubject. In your laſt publication you gave notice, that you had no inclination to carry on the controverſy for life, and that if any or all of your opponents ſhould think proper to write again, the preſs was open, but unleſs ſomething very extraordinary ſhould appear, you did not intend to reply. I cannot blame you for this determination, eſpecially when I conſider on the one hand, the extenſive employment of the chriſtian miniſtry; and on the other, the length to which a diſpute with ſo many antagoniſts is likely to be carried, were you to attend to every minute objection, or to follow them into every diſtant connection with your main ſubject. Particularly as to Mr. *Taylor*, who has choſen to *intermeddle with*

ſtrife that did not belong to him, your publication having been immediately deſigned to guard againſt the oppoſite extreme; I cannot conceive that you're under obligation to make any farther rejoinder; much leſs to ſpend your life-time in diſputing over the whole body of controverſy between the Calviniſts and Arminians, which has been ſo largely and repeatedly debated on both ſides already.

While I thus juſtify *you* in declining a farther proſecution of this controverſy, I have no deſign to enter formally into it *myſelf*; but ſhall rather freely aſſign ſome reaſons, which induce me to think, there is not much need for any one to ſay a great deal in reply to Mr. *Taylor*, as it appears to me, that though he begins to abate of the candor and good temper with which he ſet out, and ſeems occaſionally to triumph over you, yet he has not anſwered your main arguments; but in fact, has in various caſes ſufficiently refuted himſelf.

I ſhall only notice in this letter, a few inſtances of what I ſuggeſted above—that your opponent begins to abate of that candor and good nature with which he ſet out.—I cannot think it candid in him to make ſuch a uſe as he does of your manner of ſpeaking, "I think," "I apprehend," &c. I ſuppoſe Mr. T. is not infallible, and if ſo, however certain he may be that he is in the right, other people will read what he writes, and conſider it, as containing no more than his *apprehenſions* of matters.—Sometimes I cannot help wondering at his diſſatisfaction. If you ſpeak of a ſentiment as your *apprehenſion* or *opinion*, even though you back your opinion with argument, he marks *that* in *Italic*, and tells his reader your "*opinion* proves nothing." If you affirm *without* thoſe qualifing terms, even though thoſe affirmations carry in them their own evidence; then he complains of your being "poſitive and peremptory in your aſſertions." How then is Mr. T. to be pleaſed? I obſerve what is more extraordinary, that both theſe complaints are made in one and the ſame paragraph.*

Mr.

* cxiv. 115.

Mr. T. appears to have been hurt by what you ſaid concerning his want of *reverence*, and the reſemblance of his objection to that made againſt the Apoſtle in the ixth of Romans. He "ſubmits it to the judgment of thoſe who are accuſtomed to think deliberately, how far any part of this was juſt—whether you did not arrogate a great deal more to yourſelf than you ought to have done—whether you ought not, prior to theſe charges, to have proved yourſelf poſſeſſed of apoſtolical authority, powers and infallibility; and to have proved by apoſtolical methods that the particular ſentiments againſt which he there objected came from heaven."* Now as to myſelf, I hope I ſhall not be deemed arrogant if I profeſs to have thought at leaſt with ſome degree of "deliberation" upon the ſubject; and I declare I cannot ſee the propriety of any thing Mr. T. here alledges. You did not compare *him* to thoſe who blaſphemouſly oppoſed the apoſtle's doctrine; your compariſon reſpected barely his mode of reaſoning, and not his perſon or character. Nor does what you have alledged require that you ſhould prove yourſelf poſſeſſed of apoſtolical infallibility. The whole of what you ſay amounts to no more than this, that the reſemblance of his objection (ix Letters, page 50.) to that made by the adverſaries of the apoſtle, in Rom. ix. 19. ought to make him ſuſpect whether the ſentiments he maintains are not too near a-kin to theirs; and whether the ſentiments he oppoſes are not of the ſame ſtamp with thoſe of the apoſtles; otherwiſe how is it that they ſhould be liable to have the ſame objections made againſt them? This is all that your words convey; and far from arrogating any thing to yourſelf more than you ought to do, they contain a modeſt, yet ſolid argument; an argument which Mr. T. has in no ſort anſwered, and I am inclined to think, never will.†

* cxxxiv. 135.

† It is a good mode of reaſoning to argue from the ſimilarity of the oppoſition made to any doctrine in the days of the apoſtles, with that which is made to a doctrine in the preſent day. Mr. Caleb Evans has thus, I think, ſolidly and excellently defended the doctrine of the atonement in his four Sermons on 1 Cor. i. 23, 24. lately publiſhed.

As to what you ſaid concerning *reverence*, I obſerve in one place* he *thanks* you for it, and hopes he "ſhall profit by it;" but preſently after talks of *pardoning* you, and before he has done, charges it to a want of *candor* or *juſtice*; † and all through his piece frequently glances at it, in a manner that ſhews him to have been quite diſpleaſed. Now what can any one make of all this put together? There was either occaſion for what you wrote, or there was not—if there *was*, why talk of *pardoning* you? and why charge you with a want of *candor* or *juſtice?* If there was *not*, and Mr. T. thinks ſo, why does he *thank* you for it? How are we to reconcile theſe things? Does the one expreſs the ſtate of mind which Mr. T. would be thought to poſſeſs, and the other what he actually feels; or did he ſet out in a mild and amiable ſpirit, but before he had done loſe his temper, and not know how to conceal it.

I would not wiſh, however, to ſpend much time in pointing out the defects of your opponent's temper. We all of us, particularly when engaged in controverſy, need to *take good heed to our ſpirits*. And perhaps few can be long employed in ſo difficult a buſineſs, without affording their antagoniſt an opportunity to ſay, *Ye know not what manner of ſpirit ye are of*. If this does not provoke retaliation, it may be of uſe to the perſon reproved, but is of very little conſequence to the public, eſpecially after the firſt diſpute is over. Let us waive this ſubject in future, and paſs on to ſuch things as are of more general importance.

I do not intend minutely to particularize every article of debate between you and Mr. T. though if I were, I am perſuaded the far greater part of his obſervations might be proved to be deſtitute of propriety. I would only notice in the cloſe of this letter one or two which ſeem to come under the claſs of *general remarks*, and then proceed to the conſideration of the main ſubjects wherein you differ.

It is matter of "wonder to Mr. T. that you ſhould be

* iv. 6. † cxxxiv. 135.

the difference between one ſinner and another to God, but to the creature; and this is the very ſpirit and tendency of his whole ſyſtem, which ought to ſink it in the eſteem of every humble conſiderate mind.—But the Holy Spirit "does that for thoſe who do not believe which is ſufficient for the purpoſe, and which would bring them to faith and happineſs, if they were not to abuſe it."‡ So far as relates to objective evidence being preſented (and which is ſufficient to render men who are in poſſeſſion of their natural faculties inexcuſable) you are in this matter agreed. But in reference to the work of the Spirit itſelf, if its ſucceſs does indeed depend upon the pliableneſs of the ſubject, then ſo far ſalvation is not of grace, for the very turning point of the whole affair is owing to the creature and his own good improvement of what was given to him in common with others. To ſpeak of that being done which is ſufficient *if not abuſed*, is ſaying nothing at all. For how if the human heart ſhould be ſo depraved as that it will be ſure to abuſe every word and work of God ſhort of that which is omnipotent. That men reſiſt the Holy Spirit, and abuſe the grace of the goſpel, is true; but the queſtion is, *not* whether this their abuſe is their wickedneſs, *but* how came Mr. T. or any other man to be ſo pliable and well-diſpoſed as *not* to reſiſt and abuſe it?*

"I cannot prove," ſays Mr. T. "that the Holy Spirit does not do as much or more in this (general) ſenſe, for ſome who do not repent and believe, as for ſome

‡ xxiii. 25.

* In page xxi. 23. Mr. T. ſpeaking of believing in Chriſt, ſays, he does "not apprehend that any man has any will or power, or any concern about the matter, till the Holy Spirit work, awaken, and produce theſe in the mind." But the Holy Spirit, he thinks, operates ſufficiently in all men; *he does that* for *thoſe* who do *not* believe which is ſufficient for the purpoſe; yea he ſuppoſes, he does as much or more, in this ſenſe, for ſome who do not repent and believe as for ſome who do. xxiii. 25.—Mr. T. muſt allow that no man can ever do what he has neither *will* nor power to perform. The mind muſt be either active or paſſive in the production of the will and power he ſpeaks of. If *paſſive*, his whole ſyſtem is overthrown. If *active*, the ſuppoſed prior activity is while they have neither *will* nor *power* to act, which is abſurd.

ſome who do. Truth itſelf informs us that what was done without effect for Chorazin, Bethſaida, and Capernaum, would have been effectual for Tyre, Sidon, and Sodom." † Truth indeed does inform us of *ſomething* being done for theſe cities, but it makes no mention of the work of the Spirit in or upon them, but merely of the mighty works (or miracles) which were wrought amongſt them. Theſe *ought* to have led them to repentance, though they did not.—But did not Chriſt ſpeak as if Tyre, Sidon, and Sodom would have repented, had they enjoyed the ſame means? Yes, he did; and ſo did GOD ſpeak concerning his people Iſrael, *Surely they are my people, children that will not lie*; ſo he became their Saviour.—Again, *I looked that* my vineyard *ſhould have brought forth grapes*, and it brought forth wild grapes.—Again, Thou art not ſent unto a people of a ſtrange ſpeech and of an hard language, but to the houſe of Iſrael---*Surely had I ſent thee to them, they would have hearkened unto thee.*—Laſt of all he ſent his own Son, ſaying, *Surely they will reverence my Son.* (Iſai. lxiii. 8, v. 2. Ezek. iii. 5, 6. Matt. xxi. 37.) But do theſe ſpeeches prove that God really thought things would be ſo? Rather are they not evidently to be underſtood of GOD's ſpeaking after the manner of men, of what might have been expected according to human appearance?

"I do not remember," ſays Mr. T. "that the ſcripture ever aſcribes the final miſery of ſinners to the want of divine influences, &c." * True, nor do your ſentiments ſuppoſe *that* to be the cauſe of final miſery. His reaſoning on this ſubject § is extravagant. It is ſin, and ſin alone, which is the cauſe of any man's ruin. He might as well ſay, that a man is brought *into* miſery *becauſe* he is not brought *out* of it. The deſtruction of fallen angels is no more aſcribed to the want of divine mercy than that of fallen men.

Mr. T. thinks the caſes of wicked men being reſtrained from wickedneſs—godly men growing in grace, &c. may illuſtrate the ſubject in queſtion; ‡ I think ſo too,

† xxiii. 25. * xxv. 27. § xxx. 32. ‡ xxviii. 30.

too, and I dare ſay, ſo do you.—You think with him concerning men's obligations to theſe things—that much more might be done than what is done—but that if they *are* done, it is to be aſcribed to GOD, becauſe it is He who works all our works in us.—And you think the ſame of faith in Chriſt. Theſe are not things wherein you differ; but the queſtion is, though he aſcribes theſe things, as well as faith, in words to GOD, whether his ſyſtem does not aſcribe them to the creature. This it certainly does, and he as good as acknowledges it in p. l. 52. where (in contradiction to what he here aſſerts) he pleads for men's being able, *independent of the grace of the goſpel*, to abſtain from groſs abominations.

I obſerve Mr. T. has not thought proper to controvert your arguments from p. 9 to 19, for a ſpecial and *effectual* influence of the Holy Spirit; but thinks that theſe may be admitted without deſtroying his ſentiments—only obſerving that if he were to follow you through thoſe reaſonings he "ſhould queſtion the propriety of the turn you give to a few paſſages of ſcripture."* It will be time enough to reply when we know what he has to object againſt your ſenſe of thoſe paſſages. But how is it that Mr. T. would have it thought that his ſentiments are unaffected by thoſe arguments? Had he but admitted the ſentiment eſtabliſhed by thoſe arguments, it would have ſaved him much trouble which he has taken, in trying to account for GOD's doing the ſame for one man as for another, and yet *making men to differ*. If GOD works *effectually* on ſome, that is more than he will pretend that he does upon all; and this will perfectly account for a difference between one ſinner and another. And if this way of GOD's making men to differ be admitted in *ſome* inſtances it muſt in *all*, ſeeing one believer as much as another is taught to aſcribe the difference between them and others to GOD alone. (Rom. iii. 9. 1 Cor. xv. 10. John xiv. 22, 1 Cor. iv. 7.) But Mr. T. does not believe an *effectual* influence; ſuch an influence admitted would be deſtructive

* xxiv. 26.

deſtructive of his whole ſyſtem.—He ſuppoſes an effectual influence would be deſtructive of free agency and moral government. (cxxviii. 129.) That it would be deſtructive of either, according to the ſcriptural account of them, has not yet been proved; but that it would deſtroy his notions concerning them, is admitted; and this proves that an effectual influence is inconſiſtent with his ſentiments.

If Mr. T.'s reaſonings ‡ prove any thing, they prove that GOD will furniſh every man in the world with the means of ſalvation; but ſo far is this from correſponding with *fact*, that the goſpel was never preached to the far greater part of mankind who have hitherto lived; and ſome of whom Mr. T. ſuppoſes would have really believed and been ſaved, had they but heard it.*

I ſhall cloſe my remarks on this part of your debate with a few obſervations on the reſiſtableneſs or irreſiſtableneſs of the Holy Spirit. I apprehend he is both reſiſtable and irreſiſtable, in different reſpects. The following obſervations are ſubmitted to your and the readers attention. 1. GOD has ſo conſtituted the human mind, that words, whether ſpoken or written, ſhall have an effect upon it. 2. The Holy Spirit ſpeaks to men in his word. He has written to them the great things of his law. 3. It would be ſtrange if GOD's word ſhould not have ſome effect upon people's minds as well as the words and writings of men. It would be very ſtrange if neither the warnings nor expoſtulations, the threatnings nor the promiſes of GOD ſhould have any effect upon the mind, whereas the ſame things among men are conſtantly known to inſpire them with various feelings. 4. The influence of the word upon the mind, ſeeing that word is indited by the Holy Spirit, may be called in an indirect and figurative ſenſe, the influence of the Holy Spirit. It was with this kind of influence that he *ſtrove* with the Antediluvians in the miniſtry of Noah, &c. Gen. vi. 3. and was reſiſted by the Iſraelites. That is, they reſiſted the *meſſages* which the Holy Spirit ſent unto them by Moſes and the prophets; and their ſucceſſors

‡ xxxi. 33. * xxiii. 25.

ſucceſſors did the ſame by the meſſages ſent them by Chriſt and his apoſtles. Acts vii. 51. And thus the admonitions of parents, the events of providence, and the alarms of conſcience, as well as the word preached and written, may each in an indirect ſenſe, be ſaid to be the ſtrivings of the Holy Spirit. This influence *ought* to ſuffice to bring us to repent of ſin, and believe in Chriſt, and were it not for the reſiſtance which is made to it, *would* have ſuch an effect; but through the perverſeneſs of the human heart it *never has*. It is a great ſin to reſiſt and overcome it; but it is ſuch a ſin as every man while unregenerate is guilty of. 5. Beſides this, it has been allowed by many of the moſt ſteady and able defenders of the doctrine of efficacious grace, that the Holy Spirit may by his immediate but more *common* influence, impreſs the minds of unregenerate men, and aſſiſt reaſon and natural conſcience to perform their office more fully, ſo that notwithſtanding the byas of the will is ſtill bent in favour of ſin, yet they are made ſenſible of many truths contained in the word of GOD, and feel ſomewhat of that alarming apprehenſion of their danger, and of the power of the divine anger, &c. which all impenitent ſinners will experience in a much ſuperior degree at the day of judgment. But ſinners under theſe common awakenings only, continue deſtitute of that realizing ſenſe of the *excellence* of divine things, which is peculiar to thoſe who are effectually renewed in the ſpirit of their minds: and to which the power of ſin has entirely blinded the minds of the unregenerate. 6. From the depravity or perverſeneſs of the human heart ariſes the neceſſity of a *ſpecial* and *effectual* influence of the Holy Spirit. The influence before mentioned may *move* the ſoul; but it will not bring it home to GOD. When ſouls are effectually turned to GOD, it is ſpoken of as the reſult of a ſpecial exertion of almighty power. GOD who COMMANDED the light to ſhine out of darkneſs, hath ſhined in our hearts, to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of GOD in the face of Jeſus Chriſt. 2 Cor. iv. 6. Thy people *ſhall be willing* in

 the

the day of thy *power*. Pſ. cx. 3. I *will put* my law in their inward part, and write it on their hearts; and I will be their GOD, and they ſhall be my people. Jer. xxxi. 33. Who hath believed our report? and to whom hath the *arm of the* LORD *been revealed?* Iſa. liii. 1.

Theſe obſervations may account for ſeveral things which Mr. *Taylor* has remarked—particularly in page xxvi. xxvii. 28, 29. without ſuppoſing that the *ſpecial* operations of the Holy Spirit are ever finally overcome.

I am your's, &c.

LETTER III.

Dear Sir,

THE ſecond general ſubject in debate between you and Mr. T. reſpects the nature of that *inability* of which mankind are the ſubjects in reſpect of compliance with the will of GOD; or more particularly, original ſin, human depravity, and the *grace of* GOD. On theſe ſubjects he has written his iv, v, and vi letters. Mr. T. ſets out with an obſervation on *free-agency*, which diſcovers, in my opinion, the ground of a great many other of his miſtakes. He ſuppoſes that a *moral* as well as *natural* ability to comply with the commands of GOD, is neceſſary to render us free-agents. Hence he does not ſeem to conſider man as a free-agent in reſpect to keeping or not keeping the *law*, but barely "with regard to thoſe objects which GOD in his *goſpel* preſents to him, as a fallen creature, to recover him from his fallen ſtate."* And yet he ſpeaks in the ſame page of his thus being a "ſubject of GOD's *moral* government."—Strange indeed, that he ſhould not be a free-agent in reſpect of the moral law, and yet that he ſhould be a ſubject of GOD's moral government; yea, and that the moral law ſhould notwithſtanding be to him "a rule of life."† If we are not free-agents in reſpect of the moral law, we cannot be the ſubjects of GOD's

* xxxiv. 36. † lx. 61.

God's moral government, but rather of ſome ſuppoſed evangelical government.

A free-agent is *an intelligent being who is at liberty to act according to his choice, without compulſion or reſtraint*— and has not man this liberty in reſpect of the *law* as well as the *goſpel?* Does he in any inſtance break the law by compulſion, or againſt his will? Surely not. It is impoſſible the law ſhould be broken in ſuch a way; for where anything is done without, or againſt volition, no equitable law, human or divine, will ever blame or condemn. Mr. T.'s great miſtake in theſe matters lies in conſidering a *byas of mind* as deſtructive of free-agency. If a byas of mind to evil, be it ever ſo deep-rooted and confirmed, tends to deſtroy free-agency, then the devil can be no free-agent, and ſo is not accountable for all his enmity againſt God. The ſame may be ſaid of thoſe who are, as Mr. T. expreſſes it, become "unimpreſſible,"* and *cannot ceaſe from ſin.* It is not ſufficient to ſay that "they *had* power to receive the word till they wilfully reſiſted, and rejected the truth;" if Mr. T.'s notion of free-agency be juſt, they ought to have had power *at the time*, or elſe not to have been accountable. Mr. T. conſtantly reaſons from *natural* to *moral* impotency, and in theſe caſes admits of no difference between them; but he knows that in reſpect of the former, if a man is unable to perform anything that is required of him *at the time*, he is to all intents and purpoſes excuſable; yea, though he may have brought his impotency upon himſelf by his own crimes. Suppoſe, for example, a man deſtroys both health and reaſon by mere debauchery and wickedneſs, ſo as to become a poor ghaſtly ideot, can any one ſuppoſe that, *in that ſtate of mind*, it is juſt to require him to perform the buſineſs of a man; or to puniſh him for his omiſſion, under the pretence that he *once had* reaſon and ſtrength, but by his wickedneſs had loſt them. No, far be it from either God or man to proceed in this manner! If then there is no difference between natural and moral impotency, thoſe who are

* xxvi. 28.

become "unimpreſſible," and are given up of GOD to ſin, (as were Judas, and the murderers of our LORD) are not free-agents, and ſo are not accountable beings.

Farther, If a byas of mind to *evil*, be it ever ſo confirmed, tends to deſtroy the free-agency of the ſubject, the ſame would hold true of a byas to *good*: which Mr. T. indeed ſeems to allow, for he aſks, "Are not free-agents capable of ſinning?"† As if it was eſſential to free-agency to be capable of doing wrong. But has Mr. T. forgot that neither GOD, nor Chriſt (even when upon earth) nor ſaints in glory, are capable of doing wrong? The byas of their minds is ſo invariably fixed to holineſs, that it is impoſſible they ſhould in any inſtance deviate from it, and yet will he deny them to be the ſubjects of free-agency?

Mr. T.'s ideas of free-agency have probably led him into ſome others, reſpecting the nature of *that ſin* which men commit as the effect of Adam's tranſgreſſion.* His language on that ſubject all along implies, that all the ſin which men commit as the effect of Adam's tranſgreſſion, muſt be *involuntary*; as though it was ſomething that operated within them, entirely *againſt*, or at leaſt *without* their conſent. If this ſuppoſition were true, I ſhould not wonder at his pleading for its innocence. If men were under *ſuch* a neceſſity as this of ſinning, I ſhould coincide with Mr. T. in denying their being accountable for that part of their conduct. But the truth is, there is no ſuch ſin in exiſtence. Sins of *ignorance* under the law were not oppoſed to *voluntary*, but to *preſumptuous* ſins. (Num. xv. 27--31.) There are many ſins that men commit which are not preſumptuous, but none which are in every ſenſe *involuntary*. Mr. T. perhaps will alledge the apoſtle's aſſertions in Rom. vii. that what he *would not*, that *he did*. He makes much ado about this, and your ſuppoſed inconſiſtency, in p. xli. 43, but all he ſays there was ſufficiently obviated in your firſt treatiſe, p. 194 to the end. After all, Mr. T. does not really think there *are* any

† xlix. 51. * l. 52.

any *ſins* beſides what are *voluntary*. Though he talks of believers being guilty of ſuch ſins, and of Chriſt's dying to atone for them;‡ yet he would not allow it to be juſt for any man *in his own perſon*, either to be blamed or puniſhed for them: no, he contends that it is the *concurrence of our wills that denominates us blameworthy**—which is undoubtedly true in reſpect of all perſonal blame.

When Mr. T. reviewed your firſt publication, he ſpake much in praiſe of the diſtinction between *natural* and *moral inability*; and of the *perſpicuity* of your manner of ſtating it. (ix letters, p. 9, 63, 64.) Surely he muſt not at that time have underſtood what he applauded; and having ſince diſcovered this ſword to have two edges, the *one* equally adapted to cut up ARMINIANISM, as the *other* is to deſtroy ANTINOMIANISM, he has now changed his mind, and is ſtriving to prevent its efficacy by giving another meaning to the terms, and thus involving the ſubject in darkneſs and confuſion.†

By *natural power*, Mr. T. *now* underſtands a power that is barely adapted to the performance of *natural things*; and by *moral power* a power for *moral things*.§ But natural power as *you* have uſed it, and ALL *others* who have heretofore written upon the ſubject, is as much converſant with *ſpiritual* as with *natural* things; yea, and as much with *wicked* things as with either of

‡ l. 52. * xxxix. 41.

† Had theſe terms, or the diſtinction they are uſed to ſpecify, been a new invention of your own, there would have been leſs room to have complained of this treatment: but it appears to me a ſtrange unwarrantable freedom, when we reflect that both had been uſed in exactly the ſame ſenſe as yours, by a great number of reſpectable theological writers. Whereas Mr. T.'s new ſenſe of them is entirely unprecedented; though no doubt the moſt raſh and ignorant of the *Pſeudo-Calviniſts*, would find it ſuited to ſubſerve their denial of all obligation upon natural men to perform anything ſpiritually good. But let men, as they value their ſouls, be firſt well aſſured ſuch an evaſive diſtinction will be admitted at the day of judgment, before they dare to apply it to this ſin-extenuating purpoſe. I don't charge Mr. T. with intending to put weapons into the hands of deluded Antinomians; but I beſeech him to conſider how readily they would make their advantage of ſuch a diſtinction if once admitted.

§ Letter vi. at the beginning.

them. It requires the ſame members, faculties, and opportunities, to do *good* as to do *evil*, to perform ſpiritual as to perform natural actions. To pretend therefore to diſtinguiſh the uſe of theſe terms by the objects with which they are converſant, can anſwer no end but to perplex the ſubject.

But *is natural power ſufficient for the performance of moral and ſpiritual actions?* Mr. T. ſays, No; and ſo ſay I in one reſpect. But he concludes, therefore, that if GOD require anything of a moral or ſpiritual nature of any man, it is but right that he ſhould furniſh him with *moral* power for the performance of it. Thus he all along repreſents moral ability as if it were ſome diſtinct faculty, formed by the creator for the performance of moral actions, while natural power is given for the performance of natural actions; and thus the reader is led to imagine that GOD is as much obliged to furniſh ſinful men, with the one as with the other, in order to render them accountable beings.—Whereas *moral* power is not power, ſtrictly ſpeaking, but a heart to uſe the power GOD has given us in a right manner. It is *natural* power, and that only, that is properly ſo called, and which is neceſſary to render men accountable beings. It is not neceſſary to conſtitute me an accountable being, that I ſhould be *actually diſpoſed* to holy actions; (which is the ſame thing as poſſeſſing a moral ability) but barely that *I could do ſuch actions, if I were diſpoſed*.—Indeed notwithſtanding all that Mr. T. has written to the contrary, and by whatever names he calls this power, natural or moral, he himſelf means nothing more. He does not mean to plead for its being neceſſary that men ſhould be *actually poſſeſſed* of holineſs, in order to their being free-agents; but barely that they *might* poſſeſs it *if they would*. He only pleads in fact for what you allow; and yet he thinks he pleads for ſomethig elſe, and ſo goes on, and loſes himſelf and his reader in a maze of confuſion. It is not enough for Mr. T. that you allow men may return to GOD *if they will*; they muſt have the power of *being willing, if they will*;† but this, as we ſhall ſoon ſee, is no more than

† lvi. 57.

than having the power of being *what they are*? You had represented this matter in a very forcible manner in your reply; (p. 49.) and it is a poor answer that Mr. T. makes to it, † as though you were got out of your province in writing about the *meaning* of your opponent. Surely it is a lamentable thing, if the meaning of an author cannot be come at by all he writes upon a subject. If what you imputed to him was not his meaning, why did he not give it in his next performance? "Is it uncandid to conclude he had no other meaning to give?"

I am, &c.

LETTER IV.

Dear Sir,

WHEN you affirm natural power to be sufficient to render men accountable beings, Mr. T. puts you upon *proof*; * and what is more, supposes that you have acknowledged the contrary in p. 186 of your former treatise. Whether you have not *proved* this matter already, whether Mr. T. has not *allowed* you to have proved it, and whether what you say elsewhere is not in perfect *consistency* with it, shall be examined before we have done. Mean while let us follow Mr. T. in his *three-fold* argument for the supposed innocence of *moral impotence*—"If men could never avoid it, cannot deliver themselves from it, and the blessed GOD will not deliver them, surely they ought not to be punished for it, or for any of its necessary effects." † Mr. T. complains heavily of your treating these subjects *separately*, which he wished to have considered *conjointly*. Well, there was an answer though short, in p. 29. of your reply, to the whole conjointly considered; and if he would solidly have answered *that* only, you might have excused him from all the rest.

But

† lvii. 58. * lv. 56.

† This, the reader will observe, is Mr. T.'s own way of stating it, xxxv. 37. who always chooses to represent *moral* inability in terms which are properly applicable to *natural* inability only; and hereby it is that his positions wear the face of plausibility.

But farther, I can ſee no juſtice whatever in his complaint. If three things all together conſtitute a moral inability blameleſs, it muſt be on account of ſome *tendency* that each of thoſe three things hath to ſuch an end ſeparately conſidered. What Mr. T. has ſaid of man's being compoſed of *body*, *ſoul*, and *ſpirit*,* does not prove the contrary to this; becauſe tho' *body* does not conſtitute a man, nor *ſoul*, nor *ſpirit* ſeparately conſidered, yet they each form a *component part* of human nature. If it could be proved that body, ſoul, and ſpirit, had neither of them any *part* of human nature ſeparately conſidered, that would prove that all together they could not conſtitute a man.—Suppoſe T. owes F. thirty pounds; and propoſes to pay him in *three* different articles. Accordingly T. lays down ten pounds in caſh, ten pounds in bills, and ten pounds in grain.—F. refuſes each of theſe articles in payment, for, ſays he, your caſh is all counterfeit, your bills are forged, and your grain is damaged to ſuch a degree as to be worth nothing.—T. replies, not by admitting that unleſs each article can be proved to be of value ſeparately conſidered, he cannot in juſtice deſire the whole to be accepted; but by complaining of F.'s unwarrantable manner of ſeparating the articles, and examining them apart; as if he ſhould ſay, though the caſh may be counterfeit, and the bills forged, and the grain worthleſs, *ſeparately* conſidered, yet *altogether* they make up the value of thirty pounds!

Farther, though all theſe three things are in *one place* mentioned together, yet Mr. T. did not all along conſider them conjointly, nor has he done ſo now. There need not be a greater proof of his underſtanding theſe ſubjects *diſtinctly*, than his attempting to defend them ſo, which he has done in what follows:

Firſt, he undertakes to prove that the circumſtance of men being born impure, or inheriting their propenſities from their firſt parent, does excuſe them in being the ſubjects of thoſe propenſities.†—*Original ſin* to be ſure is a myſterious ſubject. There is a difficulty attends the

* xxxvi. 38. † xxxvii. 39.

the exiſtence of evil in the ſouls of all mankind, upon every hypotheſis; but it becomes us, as Mr. T. obſerves, to hearken to "ſcripture evidence," and to admit it as deciſive: and after all, I believe the ſcriptural account of the matter will be found to have the feweſt difficulties of any. Some with *Pelagius*, deny the thing itſelf, and maintain that human depravity comes entirely by *imitation*;—others admit the fact, that we "are depraved by Adam's tranſgreſſion," but deny the guilt of ſuch depravity on that account. This appears to be the caſe with Mr. T.—Others admit both the *fact* and the *guilt* of our depravity notwithſtanding. This is your ſentiment, with which I own I coincide.—Though Mr. T. admits that men are born "impure," and that this impurity is their "depravity," a depravity which David in Pſ. li. 5. "confeſſed and lamented;" yet he maintains all this to be *blameleſs*;* and all along ſeems to claim it as a matter of juſtice, either to ſtand upon his own ground, or to receive the grace of the goſpel, as an equivalent for it. The depravity of our nature then is not the *fault* but the *misfortune* of it. It is, however, allowed to be that which is "our *ruin*, in that it deprives us of happineſs, and expoſes us to *miſery*:"‡ that is, to *undeſerved* miſery, for ſuch it muſt be, "be the miſery what it may," if it be inflicted without blame-worthineſs in the ſubject. Surely ſuch a conſtitution muſt have been very *unrighteous*, and men muſt have been very much injured after all, to be *ruined* by *that* in the guilt of which they have no concern, either perſonal or relative. Mr. T. may well repreſent it as an inducement

* By the way, is it not rather extraordinary that Mr. T. after diſtinguiſhing between *impurity* and *ſin*, *impure propenſities* and *evil diſpoſitions*, *depravity* and *blame worthineſs*, *confeſſing* iniquity and taking ſhame and blame to ourſelves on account it, ſhould exclaim againſt dealing in *metaphyſics*. Verily a man had need be endued with ſomething more than metaphyſical ſkill to make diſtinctions where there is no difference.—"I do not underſtand relative blame"—ſays Mr. T. then obviating an objection of yours, he aſks, "But how then can they be ſaid to be born *in ſin*?" and anſwers, "If I uſe the expreſſion, I mean they are born impure." (xxxviii. 40.) Be it ſo; what does *David mean*? He does not ſay, I was born impure, but, *I was ſhapen in* INIQUITY, *and in* SIN *did my mother conceive me*.

‡ xxxix. 41.

ment for GOD to give his ſon to die for them,§ if it were only to make them amends for ſuch an injury; and eſpecially as he conſiders GOD himſelf as the author of our native depravity, in conſtituting the union between Adam and his offspring.* To be ſure his ſcheme is ſo far conſiſtent. There is only this difficulty remains, how ſhall we reconcile all this with the *ſcriptures*; and with either the *juſtice* of the Lawgiver, or the *grace* of the Saviour? For it ſeems to me, that both law and goſpel, muſt ſurely be overthrown by ſuch an hypotheſis.

The ſcriptures repreſent GOD as a juſt Being, who will by no means inflict puniſhment where there is no guilt. *He doth not afflict willingly, nor grieve the children of men. To cruſh under feet all the priſoners of the earth—to ſubvert a man in his cauſe, Jehovah approveth not.* Lam. iii. 33--36. *Surely GOD will not do wickedly, neither will the Almighty pervert judgment.* Job xxxiv. 12. Surely then we might conclude, even though an apoſtle had never told us ſo, that *death* would not have *paſſed upon all men, by one man's ſin*, if in that ſin, ſome how or other, *all* had not *ſinned*. Surely death would not have reigned in the world, over them that had not ſinned after the ſimilitude of Adam's tranſgreſſion, if *ſin* had had not thus been *in the world* as its procuring cauſe. This argument (from Rom. v. 13, 14.) you urged before (p. 30.) why did not Mr. T. reply to it? "Is it uncandid to conclude it was becauſe no reply could be made?"

Farther, The ſcriptures repreſent the whole world as *guilty before GOD*—as void of every claim, except it be that of *ſhame and confuſion of face*. Jehovah ſpeaks of himſelf as being at perfect *liberty* to ſave or not to ſave men, and as being determined to exerciſe it too; *I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy, and I will have compaſſion on whom I will have compaſſion.*

Once more, The ſcriptures repreſent the gift of CHRIST as being of mere *grace*, and the greateſt inſtance

§ lxxx. 81. * lxi. 62.

inſtance of *love* that ever was diſplayed, and that becauſe it was altogether *contrary to our deſerts*. Chriſt is no where repreſented as dying for us out of pity for the injury that we had received from the firſt covenant, but on the contrary, as being actuated by mere ſelf-moved goodneſs.—*Herein is love! NOT THAT WE LOVED GOD; but that HE loved us, and ſent his Son to be the propitiation for our ſins,* 1 John iv. 10. *CHRIST died for the UNGODLY. Scarcely for a righteous man will one die: yet peradventure for a good man, ſome would even dare to die; but GOD commendeth his love towards us, in that while we were yet SINNERS, Chriſt died for us.* Rom. v. 6, 7, 8. So alſo the whole of our ſalvation is always repreſented, not as making *us* amends for an injury, but as of mere *grace*, which GOD might without any blemiſh on his character have for ever withheld. The whole epiſtle to the *Romans* is written with the very deſign to cut off all claim, to prove that *all are under ſin*, and therefore that juſtification and ſalvation are altogether of ſovereign grace. The epiſtle to the *Epheſians* is written in much the ſame ſtrain, eſpecially the *ſecond chapter*, wherein the apoſtle riſes in gradation from what they were by practice, to what they were *by nature*, namely, *children of wrath even as others*;* and all this to prove what he immediately aſſerts, that *by GRACE we are ſaved.* Yes the whole tenor of ſcripture breathes this language, *I wrought for my name's ſake—Not for your ſakes do I this, ſaith the Lord Jehovah, be it known unto you!*

But do not, "the children of traitors" frequently ſuffer for their father's crimes, even though they were no way concerned in the guilt?† Anſwer, It is not juſt for the children of a traitor to ſuffer the loſs of any *natural* right, or to be expoſed to *death* or *any puniſhment*

* But "the words *by nature*, ſays Mr. T. relate not to our birth, but to the ſtate in which we lived in ſin before our converſion." (xl. 42.) Let the reader look at the paſſage (Eph. ii. 1, 2, 3.) and judge if it is not a gradation, from what we are by *practice*, to what we are by *nature*. But ſuppoſe it to relate in a general way to our unconverted ſtate, the queſtion is, how came that ſtate to be called a ſtate of *nature*, but becauſe it is not accidentally acquired by mere imitation, but is the ſtate in which we are born into the world?

† xxxviii. 40.

ment for that in the guilt of which they have no concern; neither do they, where they are under juſt laws. Deut. xxiv. 16. There is no ſuch union ſubſiſting between a parent and a child, as between Adam and his poſterity. They are not *one* in law; the one therefore cannot juſtly ſuffer puniſhment for the other's crimes. No one pretends that it is right to puniſh them with *death*, or any corporal puniſhment. GOD to be ſure, has a right to inflict death where he pleaſes, as upon the children of *Achan*; and that becauſe all men have forfeited their lives to him, and ſuch an inſtance of diſpleaſure upon a man's family might tend to deter others from the like wickedneſs; but the children of a traitor have not forfeited their lives to a civil government, and therefore they cannot juſtly be taken away. The only thing that befalls them is *loſs*; and as to that, they may *miſs of what would have been* their ſocial privileges, ſuch as honors, and property, had their father died in poſſeſſion of them; but as they were never theirs, properly ſpeaking, they could never be deprived of them. They had no *natural* right to them, nor any right at all, but by their relation to their parents; and the parent having deprived himſelf of them, could not convey them to his poſterity.*

But

* Perhaps as near a reſemblance as any, to that part of the divine conduct, which relates to Adam and his poſterity, will be found in GOD's treatment of *a nation* or body politic. GOD in his providence deals with a nation as if it was *one perſon*. Thus GOD covenanted with *Iſrael*, not merely with thoſe who exiſted at the time, but with their unborn poſterity. Deut. xxix. 14, 15. And thus the crimes of a nation often accumulate from generation to generation, like thoſe of an individual from youth to age. *Moab*, or the nation of the Moabites, is ſaid to have *been at eaſe from his youth, and to be ſettled upon his lees, &c.* that is, from his firſt beginning to be a nation. Jer. xlviii. 2. At laſt divine vengeance falls upon ſome one generation, like as a judgment befalling a man in his old age for the crimes of his whole life. Individuals in ſuch ſeaſons may be comparatively innocent; but yet being members of a ſociety, which *as ſuch*, is deeply involved in ſin, they partake of a kind of *relative guilt*. Conſidered as individuals they are only anſwerable for their own perſonal faults, but as members of ſociety it is otherwiſe. Thus the returning captives confeſſed their national guilt, ſaying, WE *have done wickedly, and all this is come upon us becauſe of* OUR SINS. Neh. xi. 33, 37. Both Ezra and Nehemiah no doubt joined in this confeſſion, though we have no reaſon to think that their conduct as individuals, had been ſuch as to draw down the vengeance of GOD upon their country.—

But it is ſuggeſted, that we might as well be "*commended* for what Chriſt did," and for the effects of our conſtituted union with HIM; as *blamed* for what Adam did, and the effects of our conſtituted union with *him*.‡ This objection has been thought as plauſible as anything Mr. T. has advanced; and yet, if I am not greatly miſtaken, there is one part of it, at leaſt, that will entirely overthrow his own hypotheſis.—Admitting that we in no ſenſe are praiſe-worthy on account of what Chriſt hath done, I queſtion if it will follow that we are in no ſenſe blame-worthy for what Adam did. It does not appear to me a juſt concluſion, that becauſe favours may be conferred without *merit*; therefore puniſhment may be inflicted without *demerit*. But ſuppoſe this did follow, and that we are in no ſenſe blame-worthy for the ſin of Adam; yet it does not follow, that we are not blame-worthy for any of its *effects*. The caſe from which Mr. T. argues, will prove the very reverſe of this. He ſuppoſes that we are not praiſe-worthy for the *effects* of our union with Chriſt,§ than which there can hardly be a greater miſtake. Is not all heart-holineſs, and indeed every thing in us that is truly *commendable* and *praiſe-worthy*, the *effect* of our union with Chriſt? I hope Mr. T. will not deny this, though he ſo ſtrangely overlooked it. Now if holineſs of heart may be, and is *commendable*, notwithſtanding its being the effect of our union with Chriſt; then, according to his own reaſoning, unholineſs of heart may be blame-worthy, not-

C withſtanding

GOD ſpeaks of the whole human race, in relation to their firſt head, as he would ſpeak of a nation. Speaking to Iſrael, he ſays, *I had planted thee a noble vine, wholly a right ſeed, how then art thou turned into the degenerate plant of a ſtrange vine unto me?* And thus of the whole human race, GOD *hath made man upright; but they have ſought out many inventions.* Eccl. vii. 29. This is undoubtedly ſpoken of the whole ſpecies; but it cannot be ſaid of the whole ſpecies that they were made *upright*, any otherwiſe than as having a kind of exiſtence in their firſt parent. Mr. T. himſelf, when he can get out of a difficulty no other way, will acknowledge ſuch a union between Adam and his poſterity, as that what was poſſeſſed by him was poſſeſſed by them.—He talks of GOD originally giving man power to keep the law; and of this making man's condemnation for the breach of it a matter of juſtice. (cxxix. 130.)

‡ xxxvii. 39. § xxxvii. 39.

withſtanding its being the effect of our union with Adam.

It ought to be obſerved too, that *this* is the very queſtion in debate between you in this place. The point that *you* ſat out to prove, was *not* that we are to blame for Adam's tranſgreſſion, this was only a queſtion that occurred incidentally; *but* that a *moral inability, or evil propenſity of heart, in an intelligent creature, is blameworthy,* NOTWITHSTANDING *his having been born the ſubject of it.* So you had ſtated it in your reply, (p. 33.) and this I hope, has been fully proved, and that from Mr. T.'s own premiſes.

It may be farther remarked upon this ſubject, that though the holineſs of believers is the neceſſary, or certain effect of their union with Chriſt, yet they are not the ſubjects of it by compulſion, or any kind of *natural neceſſity*; but what they are, they freely chooſe to be;—and will it not hold equally true concerning the unholineſs of ſinners, that though it may be the effect of Adam's fall, yet, as they freely chooſe to be what they are, it is improper to repreſent it as that which they poſſeſs by a *natural neceſſity*.

But whether the words *natural* neceſſity, or inability, be retained or given up in this matter, Mr. T. inſiſts upon it, that our depravity comes upon us *according to the nature of things*; that is, if I underſtand him, according to the *eſtabliſhed law*, or *ſettled order* of things; and this he thinks equivalent to a *natural neceſſity*, and muſt therefore denominate it blameleſs.* But if Mr. T. can *thus* prove our native depravity blameleſs, I think I can by the ſame mode of reaſoning, prove all the fruits of it to be blameleſs too. Is there not a *ſettled order*, or an *eſtabliſhed law*, of ſome ſort, for the operations of the human mind, and indeed for all human actions? Is it not according to the *laws of nature*, according to *the nature of things*, that a man always chooſes *that* which, all things conſidered, appears in the view of his own mind the moſt agreeable; and purſues,

* lx. lxi. 62.

purſues, if he have opportunity, that which, all things conſidered, is the object of his choice? It is impoſſible that a man ſhould chooſe in any inſtance, that which, at the ſame time, and in the ſame reſpects, all things conſidered, appears in the view of his mind diſagreeable; and refuſe that which is agreeable. And it is equally impoſſible that he ſhould act in contradiction to his prevailing choice. An evil tree, according to *the nature of things*, will bring forth evil fruit; and a good tree, will bring forth good fruit; and no leſs certainly will "wickedneſs proceed from the wicked," according to the proverb of the ancients, and the manifeſt implication of our LORD's words, Matt. xii. 33, 34. but does it thence follow that the evil fruit produced by a bad heart, comes by a natural neceſſity, and is blameleſs? Which way will Mr. T. take? Will he *deny* an eſtabliſhed order in the human mind, and maintain that we chooſe totally at random, without any reſpect to what is agreeable or diſagreeable in the view of the mind;—that we act without any neceſſary connection with our prevailing choice;—and that we muſt do ſo in order to be free-agents? Or will he *admit* of ſuch a connection in the operations of the mind; and inſtead of placing all blame in actions, and none in the ſtate of the mind, as he ſeems to have done all along hitherto, will he now exculpate from blame all *thoſe acts* which neceſſarily ariſe from choice, and all thoſe volitions which neceſſarily ariſe from the view of the mind, and throw all the blame upon the ſtate of the mind itſelf? He muſt either do this, or elſe allow that what comes to paſs according to *eſtabliſhed laws*, may nevertheleſs be blame-worthy.

Mr. T. imputes our pollution by the ſin of Adam to the "direction of the All-wiſe Creator, who conſtituted the union between Adam and his offspring."* This, to be ſure, is the way to prove it innocent; for GOD cannot be the *author of confuſion* in the univerſe, any more than *in the churches*. But let us beware, leſt we *charge GOD fooliſhly*. That GOD was the author of the

* lxi. 62.

union referred to, is admitted; but that he is the author of whatever that union may be the occaſion of, is not true. May not GOD be the author of an eſtabliſhed connection between the underſtanding, will, affections, and actions, without being the author of the depravity of any action that takes place through the medium of that connection?

You affirmed that *love to GOD with all the heart* muſt, of neceſſity, imply the abſence of all evil propenſity to rebel againſt him.—This Mr. T. denies, telling us that you have not *proved* it, and that he apprehends you are not capable of proving it.*—That is, of proving that a perfect degree of love implies the abſence of all averſion! This reminds me of what is ſaid elſewhere, that you "have taken it for granted, that regeneration ALLUDES to that law of nature wherein life precedes motion;" but Mr. T. does "not think it will be eaſy to prove it."† It is very true, nothing is more difficult of *proof* than that which is ſelf-evident.

The apoſtle Paul declared, that, *to be carnally-minded is death—becauſe the carnal mind is enmity againſt GOD, for it is not ſubject to the law of GOD, neither indeed CAN be. So then they who are in the fleſh*, adds he, *cannot pleaſe GOD*. Rom. viii. 6, 7, 8. But to be carnally-minded, according to Mr. T. does not deſerve death; and the very reaſon which the apoſtle gives for its being death ſerves, according to his opinion, to prove it innocent; and if ſo (unleſs GOD be an hard maſter) why ſhould not they be able to *pleaſe* him? Paul meant to deny that the carnal mind is ſubject to the law of GOD *in fact*; but Mr. T.'s reaſoning tends to a denial of its being ſubject to it *in right*. Paul conſidered unconverted ſinners as incapable of *pleaſing* GOD, on account of their carnality;—Mr. T.'s argumentation implies that GOD is, *on that account*, incapable of being *diſpleaſed* with them.

When you reaſoned thus, "If blame does not lie in being the *ſubject* of an evil diſpoſition (or impure propenſity,

* xl. 42. † xiii. 15.

penſity, if Mr. T. can tell the difference) becauſe as individuals we could not avoid it; then, for the ſame reaſon, it cannot lie in the *exerciſe* of that diſpoſition, unleſs that alſo can be avoided."—Mr. T. replies, that to indulge, denotes *the concurrence of our wills*; but our wills had nothing to do with the ſtate in which we were born.* But this is no anſwer to your argument. You was not anſwering any argument of his ariſing from the concurrence, or non-concurrence of our wills, but from what he calls the *want of power*. Men, by his own confeſſion, have not power to go through life free from every degree of the indulgence of their propenſities, for that, according to his ideas, would be to keep the law perfectly; but he does not pretend that men can do this, no not even by the grace of GOD.† But if the want of power excuſes in the one caſe, it does in the other; for he maintains, that "no man is to blame for what he could never avoid."‡ And ſo the exerciſe of an evil propenſity may be as blameleſs as the propenſity itſelf. But paſſing this,—

Mr. T. thinks, it ſeems, that if the *will concur* with an evil propenſity, then it becomes blame-worthy. I wiſh that he would abide by this doctrine. If I could depend upon that, I would aſk him whether he can conceive of an evil propenſity in his own mind, any otherwiſe than as the very ſtate and byas of his will towards evil? To talk of an involuntary propenſity in the mind of a rational being, is to talk without meaning, and in direct contradiction to the plaineſt dictates of common ſenſe. If then the concurrence of the will, denominates a thing blame-worthy, we need have no more diſpute whether an evil diſpoſition, in a rational being, be in *itſelf* blame-worthy, ſeeing the concurrence of the will is included in the very nature of a propenſity. Whatever may be ſaid about our propenſities at the time we were born, of which we can form but little idea, the queſtion between you is, whether an impure propenſity, in a rational being, may not be blame-worthy *notwithſtanding* its being received by derivation? and

* xxxix. 41. † lx. 61. ‡ xlvii. 48.

Mr. T. ſeems to think that whatever impurity obtains the concurrence of the will, is criminal.—But this is no more than may be ſaid of all propenſity in a rational being, the thing itſelf being expreſſive of the byas of the will.

Here I expect Mr. T. will not be ſatisfied.—Yet why ſhould he not? Becauſe he has a notion in his mind that it is neceſſary not only that we ſhould be voluntary *in* a propenſity, but that we ſhould chooſe to be of ſuch a propenſity before we are ſo, in order to denominate us blame-worthy. It is a leading principle with Mr. T. that men *might have* a moral ability to do good, *if they would*; and that if this were not the caſe, they could not be blame-worthy—that is, they might have a *good diſpoſition* if they were but *well-diſpoſed!* "I confeſs," ſays Mr. T. "it appears to me as equitable to condemn a porter becauſe he does not calculate eclipſes by the ſtrength of his body, or a feeble philoſopher becauſe he does not perform the buſineſs of a porter by his refined underſtanding, as to condemn a man who has only *natural* ability, and never had, and never COULD HAVE any other, becauſe he does not perform moral and ſpiritual duties."* To this alſo the *Monthly Reviewers* bear their teſtimony of applauſe.† And elſewhere Mr. T.

* Iv. 56.

† The *Monthly Reviewers* having pronounced Mr. T.'s cauſe to be *good*, and particularly applauded the above paſſage, add, "Here is a "diſtinction between what is called a *moral* and a *natural* power, "with which theſe writers perplex themſelves. Perhaps if they in- "troduced the term *rational*, which ſeparates man from the brute, it "might aſſiſt them a little in the conteſt." *Rev.* for *Sept.* 1788.—I cannot tell what uſe the Reviewers wiſh to have made of the term *rational*, nor whether they are ſerious or not in their advice; but if theſe gentlemen mean to ſuggeſt that the term *rational* would do to ſupercede the terms *natural* and *moral*, by anſwering all their purpoſes, I cannot, for my part, acquieſce in their opinion.

I am not inclined to think the Monthly Reviewers deſtitute of *rational* powers; and yet it is pretty evident they are, ſomehow or other, *unable* to do juſtice to Calviniſtic writings; or ſo much as to read them with impartial attention. Let any unprejudiced perſon look over their Review, and he will ſee that if any thing controverſial is written in favour of Arminianiſm, or Antrinitarianiſm, it is generally much applauded; but if anything comes out in favour of Trinitarianiſm, or Calviniſm, either its weakneſſes are expoſed, or cold water is thrown upon the ſubject. See the Rev. of Bampton's

T. ſays, "It is to very little purpoſe to alledge that *Pharoah* and others, *could* have complied *if they would*; if they could never *will* to comply, they could not juſtly be puniſhed."* So then the blame does not lie in the choice of any evil, but in the choice of that choice. Pharaoh's evil did not lie in refuſing the divine meſſage, but in that though he could have had a pliable diſpoſition, yet he would not, he was not diſpoſed to be of a good diſpoſition. But ſtill an objection returns, That indiſpoſition,

Lectures, and Burder's pamphlet, Sept. 1788. Were I to look over other numbers of the Review, I might ſoon add many inſtances of ſimilar conduct; though perhaps few more illiberal than their treatment of Mr. *Newton's* Cardiphonia, *Sept.* 1781. Vol. lxv. p. 202.

Indeed, one need go no farther in proof of this than to their review of this controverſy. In the review of Mr. Taylor's ix Letters (July 1787, p. 85.) they ſay, "This pamphlet may be of ſome uſe in enlarging the conceptions of thoſe narrow-minded chriſtians, who think the kingdom of heaven no larger than the ſynagogue of their own little flock." Aſtoniſhing! When the matter of debate between you and Mr. T. was *not in the leaſt* about the *extent* of the kingdom of heaven. It did not, in the leaſt, reſpect either the *character*, or *number* of thoſe that are good men here, or that ſhall be ſaved hereafter; but the CAUSE of their ſalvation. Is it poſſible for gentlemen, of only common ſenſe and erudition, to write in this manner upon any ſubject, except religion? No, mere *rational* powers would there have taught them better. But here, prejudice and ſupercilious contempt get the better of their underſtandings, and impel them to write in ſuch a manner as muſt in the end cauſe their cenſures to rebound to their own diſhonour.

Though the above critique (if it may be ſo called) diſplays the groſſeſt ignorance of the ſubject; yet I really do not think it was for want of *rational* powers. The reviewers are, generally ſpeaking, men of very good abilities; but religion is not their province, nor are they *able* to treat the ſubject with impartiality.—Now as they unite with Mr. T. in thinking, that, if a man has no *moral power*, that is, no diſpoſition to do right, and cannot find in his heart ſo much as to uſe means that he may have ſuch a diſpoſition, then he cannot juſtly be blamed; they might, one ſhould think, conſider the above as a kind apology on their behalf. Should they reply, by maintaining either that they *have* a moral ability or diſpoſition to do juſtice to Calviniſtic writings, or at leaſt *might have*, if they would uſe the means. I ſhould anſwer, as to the *firſt*, facts contradict it; and as to the *laſt*, if they know of any means that perſons, utterly void of an inclination, may uſe in order to give themſelves ſuch inclination, I ſhould be glad if they would begin, and make the experiment.

If in future we ſhould ſee in the Monthly Review, ſuch manifeſt partiality againſt Calviniſtic writings as we have ſeen heretofore, we ſhall then conclude, that the Monthly Reviewers cannot find in their heart to do juſtice; nor ſo much as to uſe the means that they may have a diſpoſition to do juſtice; and if ſo, then according to the reaſonings which they ſo highly applaud, we muſt bring them in guiltleſs!

* lvi. 57.

indiſpoſition, by which he refuſed to be of a good diſpoſition, could not be blame-worthy, unleſs he could have choſen to be of a better.—But whither will this way of reaſoning lead us? If a choice or propenſity cannot be blame-worthy, unleſs it be governed by a previous act of choice, neither can *that* act of choice be blame-worthy, unleſs it is governed by another, and that by another, and ſo on in an infinite ſeries.' This is metaphyſical indeed, or rather hyper-metaphyſical. A little while ago, it was thought ſufficient if an exerciſe had but the *concurrence of the will*, that is, if we had but the power of *doing what we pleaſe*; but now it ſeems that is a matter that "is very little to the purpoſe," unleſs we have alſo the power of *chooſing what we pleaſe*.

"Pharoah, Mr. T. maintains, *could* have *willed* to comply with the meſſages that were ſent him, or he was not blame-worthy."—If no more were meant by this, than that he was poſſeſſed of the faculty, or *power* of choice, which faculty, were it not for the evil byas with which it is polluted, is equal to the choice of any object that might be preſented, you would have no objection to it.—But this is not Mr. T.'s meaning; natural power to chooſe is nothing with him, he is here pleading the neceſſity of a *moral* power, in order to our being accountable beings. Here then I muſt beg leave to inſiſt upon it, that Mr. T. does not underſtand the meaning of his own expreſſions, no, nor the *Monthly Reviewers* neither; or rather, that the expreſſions have no meaning at all. What does Mr. T. maintain? that Pharoah *could find in his heart*, at the time, to will a compliance? no, he will not ſay ſo, for that were the ſame thing as *being willing*; but that would contradict fact, for we know he was *not* willing. What then does Mr. T. mean? He muſt mean this, if any thing, that he *could have been willing, if he would*; that is, *he could have willed, if he had willed*; but this is no meaning at all, being a mere identical propoſition.

It is poſſible Mr. T. may here exclaim againſt ſuch a method

method of reaſoning, and appeal to common ſenſe, and common equity, " that no perſon is blame-worthy for the omiſſion of what he could not perform." It is granted to be a dictate of common ſenſe, and common equity, that no perſon ſhould be blamed for the omiſſion of that which he could not DO if he would; but not that he ſhould be excuſed for the neglect of that which he could not WILL *if he would*, for there is no ſuch thing in being. So far is this from being a dictate of common ſenſe, there is no ſenſe in it, nor do they that talk of it underſtand what they mean.*

" When people puzzle themſelves upon this ſubject," ſays a judicious writer, " and inſiſt, we are not ac-" countable, and cannot be blamed, any farther than we " have a *moral* as well as a *natural* power to do otherways " than we do, what their minds run upon is only *na-*" *tural* power after all. They may ſay they know what " we mean by moral power, viz. that diſpoſition to do " a thing which is neceſſary in order to our doing it; " and they mean the ſame. But, however, when they " get into the diſpute they get bewildered, and loſe " ſight of the diſtinction. *They* do not ſuppoſe an im-" penitent ſinner, going on ſtill in his treſpaſſes, has a " *preſent, actual* diſpoſition, and a ſufficiently ſtrong one, " to hearken to, and obey the goſpel. But ſomething " like this ſeems to be in the bottom of their minds, " viz. that he muſt be *able* to be diſpoſed; or he muſt " have ſuch a diſpoſition as *would* be ſufficient, *if he was* " *diſpoſed* to make a good uſe of it. Now this is only " to uſe the word *diſpoſition* improperly, and to conceive " of it as a mere natural power; a price in our hands, " which may be uſed well or ill, and which will turn to " our benefit or condemnation accordingly as we are diſ-" poſed to improve it. The diſpoſition they think of is " not in the leaſt degree virtuous, nor anyways neceſ-" ſarily connected with virtuous conduct. But it may " lie ſtill, or go wrong, and will do ſo, unleſs a man " is

* The reader may conſult on this ſubject, Preſident EDWARDS on the *Will*; particularly part iv. ſec. iii, iv, and xiii. In that piece he will find this notion, with many others, upon which Mr. T.'s ſyſtem reſts, thoroughly refuted.

" is diſpoſed and exerts himſelf to make it act, and " keep it right. The ſinner is not helped out of his " difficulty in the leaſt by having ſuch a diſpoſition as " this. Yea, ſhould we go farther, and ſay, the im- " penitent ſinner might have a heart to embrace the " goſpel, *if* he would take proper pains in order to it; " and he might do this, *if* he was ſo diſpoſed; and he " might be ſo diſpoſed, *if* he would try; and he could " try, *if* he had a mind for it.—Yet IF, after all, he " *has not* a mind to try, to be diſpoſed, to take any " proper pains, to get a heart to embrace the goſpel, " or do any thing that is good; he is ſtill in as bad a " ſituation as any body ſuppoſes him to be in. There " is no more hope of his coming to good, ſo long as " this is the caſe with him, no more poſſibility of it; " nor do we ſay any thing more in his favour, than if " we had only ſaid as the ſcripture does of the fool, " *There is a price in his hand to get wiſdom; but he has* " NO HEART TO IT. Puſhing the ſinner's moral de- " pravity and impotence back in this manner, may get " it out of ſight of thoſe who cannot ſee above two or " three ſteps: but this is all the good it can do. There " is ſtill a defect in him ſome where; and ſuch a one as " will prove his everlaſting ruin, unleſs removed by " ſuch grace as he has never yet experienced."—*Smalley on the Inability of the Sinner to comply with the Goſpel*, &c. p. 20, 21.

I am, dear ſir, your's, &c.

LETTER V.

Dear Sir,

THE *ſecond* thing which Mr. T. defends, is what he had written on men's inability to deliver themſelves from their inability, he conceives it muſt furniſh them with an excuſe, " if they cannot deliver themſelves from it." This takes up the former part of his Vth. Letter. To be ſure we are now got into the regions of metaphyſics, if not beyond them; but it ought to be remembered that theſe modes of ſpeaking are

are of Mr. T.'s own invention. You had urged the conſequences of Mr. T.'s opinion on this ſubject before, as a ſufficient refutation of it; but he replies by reſuming his old complaint, of your conſidering thoſe ſubjects *ſeparately*, which ought to have been conſidered *conjointly*. This is all that he has advanced in anſwer to what you have written from p. 37 to 41.

It ſhould ſeem, that in *certain circumſtances*, Mr. T. will admit a moral inability, though real and total, to be blame-worthy.—That is, 1ſt. Where a perſon brings it upon himſelf by his own perſonal wickedneſs.† 2d. Where grace is offered to deliver him from it, and he refuſes it. In theſe caſes it ſeems Mr. T. will not become the ſinner's advocate, but admit him to be guilty.‡ But let it be cloſely conſidered, *if the thing itſelf* is not blame-worthy, let us come by it in what manner we may, and though grace ſhould or ſhould not be provided to deliver us from it, whether either of the above circumſtances will make it ſo. You may blame a man for his conduct in bringing his mind *into* ſuch an "unimpreſſible" ſtate, but the ſtate of the mind itſelf is not *thereby* made culpable. Mr. T. often appeals to common equity amongſt men, whether it is right to puniſh a man for the omiſſion of what was never within the compaſs of his power; but it is as plain a dictate of common equity, that a man is not to blame for the omiſſion of what he has not the power to perform *at the time*, as that he is not to blame for what *never was* in his power. If once he had power, he was *then* to blame, but not ſince he loſt it; for as Mr. T. ſays, "what a man cannot do, he cannot do." Sampſon was to blame for loſing his hair, and thereby his ſtrength; but not for being unable *when he had loſt it*, to repel the enemy and preſerve his eyes.—Neither does the poſſibility of having our moral impotency removed, make any alteration as to the *thing itſelf*. If our oppoſition of heart to GOD, in itſelf conſidered, is not blame-worthy, the circumſtance of our having grace offered to deliver us from it, cannot make it ſo. Suppoſe a man

† xxvi. 28. ‡ xlv. 47.

man to be fallen into ſome deep pit,—and that he is weak, and incapable of getting out,—but ſome kind friend offers him his hand;—*now*, ſays Mr. T. the man is to blame if he does not get out. I anſwer, he is to blame for refuſing help, but that does not prove him to blame for his own perſonal *inability*.—Thus by ſhifting the argument from one to the other of theſe *three* ſubjects, and dwelling upon none, Mr. T. ſhuts out blame-worthineſs from all moral impotence, *in itſelf* conſidered; and ſo no man is to blame for the enmity of his heart to GOD, be it ever ſo great. Though the carnal mind is *enmity againſt* GOD, and is not ſubject to the law of GOD, neither indeed *can* be;—though their ear is uncircumcized, and they *cannot* hearken;—though they being evil, *cannot* ſpeak good things;—though they have eyes full of adultery, and *cannot* ceaſe from ſin;—and though upon this account it be *impoſſible*, but that offences will come; yet there is no harm in all this; nothing for which GOD ſhould ſpeak in ſuch a tone of diſpleaſure; the whole of their blame-worthineſs conſiſts either in their *getting into* ſuch a ſtate of mind, or in neglecting to uſe the means of *getting out!* And thus your argument, after all, ſtands its ground; that according to Mr. T.'s principles, men are excuſable in proportion to the ſtrength of their evil propenſities.

Let us next follow Mr. T. in his defence of the *third* branch of his poſition, concerning the non-proviſion of *Grace*. The reader will remember that the queſtion here, is *not* whether grace IS, or is NOT provided; *but* whether, *ſuppoſing* it is *not*, men are excuſable in their non-compliance with the goſpel. Mr. T.'s views upon this ſubject are as a mill-ſtone about the neck of his ſyſtem, that muſt needs ſink it in the eſteem of all who underſtand the argument, and expect to be ſaved by *grace alone*. He talks much of Grace, of Free-grace, and of Salvation by Grace, and yet it is not more evident that the ſun ſhines at noon-day, than that he makes the whole of our ſalvation a *debt*, a debt which GOD of his "*univerſal benevolence*" is excited to pay,

from

from the conſideration that we "did not bring everlaſting miſery upon ourſelves, nor was it ever in our power to avoid it."*

It is pity that we ſhould cover our ideas by improper words. It is evident Mr. T. means to appeal to the divine *juſtice*, only he has not courage ſufficient to ſay ſo, and therefore uſes the term *benevolence*. But if this is the truth, that men are pitiable creatures; much injured by the fall, but no way concerned in the guilt of it, or any of its certain effects; and that this is a conſideration with the great Jehovah to ſave them; what a goſpel have we ſent us at laſt, and what a repreſentation of the divine character! The Father ſends the Son to atone for men's guilt, and deliver them from everlaſting miſery, from the conſideration that there was nothing in that guilt, antecedent to his ſending his Son, and offering them grace, that properly deſerved ſuch miſery, or indeed any miſery at all!—The covenant which God originally made with man is ſo ſevere, that if he abide by it, he muſt deal *cruelly* with his rational offſpring;—ſo ſevere that he cannot ſtand to it throughout; but is induced, with a view to make the ſons of Adam amends for the injury done them by their father's fall, to ſend them a ſaviour, and offer them aſſiſtance that they may make their eſcape. All this is but the juſt picture of the divine character and conduct according to Mr. T.'s ſcheme.—But is this the real character and conduct of God? Is mercy indeed built up upon the ruins of equity; or does the *grace* of the ſecond covenant imply a reflection upon the *juſtice* of the firſt? Is this the character of that God who declares that men who never heard the goſpel of *grace* are *without excuſe*?—that *all the world* are become *guilty before Him*;—that ſalvation is altogether of grace;—that he is not only at liberty to *have mercy on whom he will have mercy*, but will exerciſe that liberty, and *will have compaſſion on whom he will have compaſſion*?

You urged theſe conſequences in your *Reply*, that according to Mr. T.'s ſcheme, "making this ſuppoſed

* lxxix. lxxx. 81.

grace the only thing which conſtitutes men accountable beings, was making it DEBT rather than GRACE."— And what has Mr. T. ſaid in anſwer to this objection.* "(1.) When I ſpeak of grace, ſays he, I wiſh to ſpeak of *real* not *ſuppoſed* grace." That may be, and I hope it is ſo, but the queſtion is, will his hypotheſis coincide with the wiſhes of his heart on this ſubject? "(2.) Suppoſe," ſays Mr. T. "we excuſe his play on the word *grace*, which is not in the ſentence to which he is making this laboured reply, and his change of *puniſhed* for *accountable*, yet ſtill, the poſition to which he refers, does not ſpeak of grace as the *only* thing which renders men accountable. You remember, ſir, the poſition is, "If men could not avoid it, &c."— I obſerve, Mr. T. ſeems all along to wiſh to repreſent you as having beſtowed great pains to unravel one poor little period; whereas what you have written about *grace* is not merely in reply to that ſingle period (as you declared in your Reply, p. 20.) but to the whole of what Mr. T. had written upon the ſubject, which in that period happens to be nearly expreſſed.—But he denies that he has repreſented grace as the *only thing* which renders men accountable; how he can make this denial good is more than I can conceive. He advances *three* things which, together, would make men *not* accountable. The firſt *two* of theſe he admits actually to exiſt;† the laſt, therefore, muſt be the *only* thing left which can render men accountable, or if he likes it better, puniſhable.—But where is the anſwer after all to your objection? Has he proved his notion of *grace* to be any more than *debt?* Not at all, nor ſo much as attempted it. "Is it uncandid to conclude, that it was becauſe he felt the attempt would have been in vain?" You farther objected, that according to Mr. T.'s ſcheme, there was no need for Chriſt to have died at all, and that if the divine Being had but let men alone, and had not provided any grace for them, they had been all very innocent, and, if juſtice had but been done them, very happy. To this Mr. T. replies by aſking (1.) Whether you can prove that without the beſtowment

* xlvii. 49. † ix Lett. p. 44, 57, 59.

ſtowment of grace, there would ever have been any men to be free from criminality? Can he prove, ſays he, "that Adam would not have died immediately, according to the threatening, if grace had not been given in the promiſe."*—"*According to the threatening*," —that is begging the queſtion. The queſtion is, whether that threatening implied in it the immediate and actual execution of corporal death? If what Mr. T. ſays elſewhere is true, namely, that Adam's poſterity were by his fall "expoſed to *miſery*, whatever that miſery be,"† it could not; for non-exiſtences could never be expoſed to miſery of any kind. If in Adam *all died*; if by one man ſin entered into the world, and death by ſin, and ſo death *paſſed upon all men*, for that all have ſinned; this muſt imply the *exiſtence* of all men, for death cannot paſs upon non-entities. But it is aſked (2.) "Suppoſe Adam had not died, can Mr. F. prove that Adam's poſterity would have been ſent to hell for their father's ſin, or for any of its neceſſary conſequences?" Suppoſe they had not, and ought not, then it only tends to confirm your reaſoning rather than refute it, which was to prove that, if things are as Mr. T. repreſents, men might have been innocent and happy if Jeſus had never died, and ſo that the gift of Chriſt and the goſpel was no real benefit, but rather a curſe upon the world, as it is this only that has rendered men capable of ſinning ſo as to become *everlaſtingly* miſerable.

The remaining queſtions,‡ have, for the ſubſtance of them, been already diſcuſſed. (Reply 46--49.) Neither are they in point to the preſent ſubject in debate. They contain a queſtion of *fact*; but that which is now in diſcuſſion is a queſtion of *right*. Were I to admit the univerſal extent of Chriſt's death as a *fact*, and the utmoſt advantages as reſulting from it; ſtill I ſhould reprobate with all the powers of my ſoul, the principles upon which Mr. T. pleads for it, as deſtructive of the grace of the goſpel, and hoſtile to the throne of God.

* xlviii. 50 † xxxix. 41. ‡ xlix. 51.

Mr. T. had maintained in his ix Letters, 1. That man was ſo reduced by the fall as to be totally unable to do anything really good. 2. That if he had been left in this condition, he would not have been to blame for not doing it, but that his inability would have been his excuſe;—yea, *let his practices have been as vile as they might*, upon your principles,—that is, upon the ſuppoſition of grace not being provided, he declares, *he* "*would have been excuſable*; and all real good whatever might be denied to be the duty of the unprincipled mind."† From hence you concluded that if it were ſo, then Chriſt did not die for the *ſins* of any man, becauſe antecedent to the conſideration of his death, and of grace being given in him, there was no *ſin*, or blame-worthineſs to atone for. What a buſtle does Mr. T. make concerning this concluſion; calling it "a wonderful paſſage," and your reaſonings, "*mere parade*," —imputing it to the "imbecility of the human mind, and to the diſadvantageous ſituation to which the moſt upright diſputant may be reduced," &c.* Methinks I ſee you ſmile at this friendly apology; but muſt own it appears to me more adapted to himſelf than his opponent. You wrote before in the language of diffidence. The conſequences of Mr. T.'s ſentiments appeared ſo everſive of the whole goſpel, you could hardly help ſuſpecting that you muſt have miſtaken him ſomehow or other. Accordingly you gave him a fair opportunity to clear himſelf if he could. But it is time now for that language to be laid aſide. He has tried to defend his hypotheſis, but it is abſolutely indefenſible.

What has Mr. T. ſaid in anſwer to your reaſoning? Why he has, as uſual, aſked a number of *queſtions*.§ "Suppoſe Chriſt had never come, and no grace had been provided, does not Mr. F." he aſks, "allow that man is a free-agent, and therefore might have ſinned voluntarily;"‡ Yes, you do; you ſuppoſe the devil to

† ix Lett. 57, 59. * li. 52.

§ Mr. T. it ſeems, expected to be anſwered in a way of direct reply (vi. 8.) But it would fill a volume of no ſmall ſize, only to give a direct anſwer to all his and Mr. Martin's *queſtions*.

‡ xlix. 51.

to be a free-agent, though his heart is, and ever will be, invariably ſet in him to do evil; but the queſtion here is not what *you* allow, but what Mr. T. allows. Though *you* allow man to be a free-agent independent of the grace of the goſpel, *he* does not; he conſiders *moral* as well as *natural* neceſſity as inconſiſtent with free-agency:—that if no grace were provided, "let a man's *practices be as vile as they might*, he would be excuſable."—And it was from *his* ſuppoſition, and not your own, that you were reaſoning.

But he aſks farther, "Is nothing done wrong in this world but what is the neceſſary, and unavoidable effect of Adam's tranſgreſſion? Are not all our *voluntary* ſins juſtly chargeable upon us?"* Anſwer, I know of no ſuch neceſſity that impels men to ſin *in*voluntarily; and as to the evils that are *now* done in the world, or not done, they are nothing at all to the point; nor whether they are done in conſequence of Adam's tranſgreſſion, or not.—Suppoſe they are done ſimply in conſequence of men's own free-agency; will Mr. T. allow that they would have had that free-agency, and have been accountable beings, without the death of Chriſt and the grace of the goſpel?—If he will *not*, your conſequence ſtill remains unmoved, namely, that according to him, 'Chriſt did not come into the world to ſave men from ſin, but rather to put them into a capacity of ſinning; as it is in conſequence of his death, and that alone, that guilt becomes chargeable upon them.'—But if, on the other hand, he *will* allow this, he muſt in ſo doing, diſallow of the ſubſtance of all his former reaſonings. Particularly he muſt diſown that extravagant language, that "if your principles are true, *let a man's practices be as vile as they may*, he may excuſe himſelf from blame."

"Mr. F. juſtly obſerves," ſays Mr. T. "that I ſuppoſe fallen man, really and totally unable to do good; and I explained my meaning by ſaying *ſpiritually* good; but is there no medium between doing what is *ſpiritually good*, and going to the utmoſt lengths of wickedneſs?

* l. 52.

wickedneſs? Are men under the neceſſity of working all abominations becauſe they cannot without divine grace ſerve GOD ſpiritually? Do not men work theſe abominations? Did not Chriſt die to atone for them? Did he not then die for OUR SINS?"* Now Mr. T. thinks he has eſcaped the charge. But let it be obſerved, Though in *one* place he had uſed the term *ſpiritual*, yet in another, he extended blameleſſneſs to "PRACTICES, be they AS VILE as they MAY, if your ſentiments were true," that is, if grace were not provided. Now whatever medium there may be, between not doing things *ſpiritually good*, and working all abominations, there is none, I ſhould think, between *vile practices*, and abominations. Mr. T. therefore, is as far off as ever from removing the ſhocking conſequences of his ſentiments.

I am, dear ſir,
Your's, &c.

LETTER VI.

Dear Sir,

PERHAPS Mr. T. will again complain, that too much is made of the *Ratio ex conceſſis*, and the *Reductio ad abſurdum*.† Well, it is not my wiſh to bear too hard upon him, though after all it would have diſcovered a commendable frankneſs conſonant to his own profeſſion,‡ to have confeſſed that he had ſaid rather too much, inſtead of complaining of you for having improved it againſt him. But let us take it as he has *now* ſtated it, that *without the grace of GOD* men cannot do anything really or *ſpiritually* good; but they may do ſome things otherwiſe good, or at leaſt refrain from groſs immoralities; and this is all they are obliged to do, antecedently to the beſtowment of grace; and conſequently the whole of their ſin conſiſts in the contrary of this; and theſe are all the ſins for which there was any need for Chriſt to atone.—Now will Mr. T. ſtand

* l. 52. † li. 53. ‡ xiii. 15.

ſtand to *this* hypotheſis? It is the only ground left him to ſtand upon, in ſupporting the body of his ſyſtem. And in order to poſſeſs *this*, he muſt retract his extravagant ſentence in p. 59 of his ix letters; and perhaps much more. Let him ſoberly conſider whether he can ſtand his ground even here, without giving up at leaſt the *three* following ſentiments, each of which he has hitherto avowed, and for one of them moſt ſtrenuouſly contended.

1. That the moral law is *ſpiritual*, and requires love to GOD with all the heart; and that this law is the rule of life to fallen men, antecedent to, and independent of, the conſideration of the beſtowment of grace.—If nothing but an abſtinence from groſs abominations is incumbent on men, antecedent to the beſtowment of grace, then either the law does not require the heart, or men are not under it as the rule of life.

2. That if unconverted ſinners are preſerved from the *greateſt lengths of wickedneſs*, it is to be aſcribed to the preventing and reſtraining grace of GOD.—This Mr. T. has hitherto avowed.† But if he will maintain the above hypotheſis, this alſo muſt be given up. The whole of Mr. T.'s argument‡ goes upon the ſuppoſition that if grace had never been beſtowed or provided, yet men might have refrained from groſs abominations; for it is brought to prove that men would not have been *utterly* blameleſs without the proviſion of grace; and ſo that were *ſome* ſins for Chriſt to die for antecedent to the conſideration of his death, and the grace of the goſpel. But if ſo, their being preſerved from groſs wickedneſs is not and ought not to be aſcribed to the *grace* of GOD.

3. That Chriſt died for the ſins of the whole world. —I need not prove to the reader that Mr. T. maintains this ſentiment; but if he will abide by the above hypotheſis, this (all important as he accounts it) muſt be given up. It is well known that the far greater part of the world die in infancy; but dying infants, accord-

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† xxviii. 30. ‡ l. 52.

ing to the above hypotheſis, and indeed according to all that he has written, can have no ſin in any ſenſe whatever for which Chriſt could have to atone. He could not therefore die for them, and as they make the greateſt part of the human race, it muſt follow that Chriſt did not die for the ſins of one half of the world after all.—Thus Mr. T. by his notion of men being excuſable on account of their *moral inability*, is driven to a moſt painful dilemma; he is driven to maintain, EITHER that men, antecedent to the death of Chriſt, and the grace of the goſpel, are not free-agents *at all*;—are not accountable beings;—no, not for even "*the vileſt of practices*," as he did in his ix letters; and then it *follows*, that Chriſt did not die to atone for the *ſins* of any man, but only Adam's firſt tranſgreſſion, there being no ſins for which he could have to atone:—and that his death and the grace of the goſpel, muſt be a curſe to the world rather than a bleſſing, as it is in conſequence of this, and this alone, that guilt becomes chargeable on men:——OR ELSE, according to what he has advanced in his *laſt performance*, that men, without the grace of the goſpel, would have been free-agents *in part*;—that they would have been capable of performing the externals of religion, and refraining from *groſs abominations*;—that they, as fallen creatures, are accountable for the contrary of theſe, and that *only*;—and that it is for ſins of this deſcription only that Chriſt could have to atone:* Then It alſo *follows*, that the law, as a rule of life to *fallen* men, is *not ſpiritual*;—that if men are preſerved from groſs abominations, it is not to be aſcribed to preventing grace;—and that Chriſt did not die for the ſins of all mankind.

Mr. T. it has been obſerved, has hitherto allowed that the moral law is *ſpiritual*, and as ſuch is the rule of life to fallen men;§ but his other ſentiments will not ſuffer him conſiſtently to abide by this. To be conſiſtent with

* 'Tis true Mr. T. talks of Chriſt having to atone for ſins of other deſcriptions; (l. 52.) but ſurely it is quite abſurd to ſpeak of his dying to atone for ſins, for which we were never blame-worthy or accountable.

§ lix. 60.

with them, he muſt either deny the *ſpirituality* of the law, or elſe its *juſtice* and *goodneſs*; that is, he muſt deny that it is fit to be a rule of life to fallen men.—Mr. T. admits the law at preſent to be *ſpiritual*; it muſt not, however, take cognizance of the *ſtate* of the *heart* or *mind*; the mind may be the ſubject of an evil propenſity, and yet be innocent;† ſo then the *carnal mind*, which is enmity againſt GOD, is nevertheleſs in that reſpect blameleſs. All that is forbidden is "the *indulgence* of evil propenſity, and the neglect of grace by which he might be delivered from it." Nor are theſe all the ſubtractions that Mr. T.'s ſcheme requires. Even *here*, it is not juſt that it ſhould require any more than men *can*, ſome way or other, find in their hearts to give; for he lays this down as a maxim, that *no man ought to be puniſhed for what he cannot avoid*.‡ But if it is not right that the law ſhould require any more than men can in every ſenſe perform, or puniſh them for their defects, then it muſt follow that either men can now perform all the law requires of them, or elſe that the law is unreaſonable; and ſo can be neither *juſt* nor *good*, nor fit to be a rule of life to fallen men. Which way will Mr. T. turn himſelf in this caſe? Will he affirm that men now *can*, in every ſenſe, perform all that the law requires? Sometimes he ſeems as if he would, for he ſpeaks of the law as forbidding only the *indulgence* of ſin; and of grace as being provided to deliver us from that.* Here, if his words have any meaning, they muſt mean that men may, through the grace of GOD, comply with all the law requires.—And yet in other places he allows that no man, ſince the fall, poſſeſſes an ability, either naturally, or by the grace of GOD, perfectly to keep the law.§ But what in and out work is here! One of theſe poſitions muſt be retracted; and Mr. T. is welcome to retract which of them he pleaſes. He may chooſe his ground. Neither will ſupport him without giving up the *ſpirituality*, *juſtice* and *goodneſs* of the law, as a rule of life to fallen men.

If

† xl. 42. ‡ li, 53. * xxxix. 41. § lix, lx. 60, 61.

If he retract the *firſt*, and allow that men *cannot*, even with the grace of the goſpel, keep the law perfectly; then, he muſt *either* maintain the law to be unreaſonable, *or* give up all his former reaſonings, and allow that it is right that GOD ſhould require men to do that which they are, and always were, and always will be in this life, *morally unable* to do.—If he chooſe to retract his other poſition,‡ and maintain that by the grace of GOD men *are* now able to comply with all that the law requires, and to avoid all that it forbids, ſtill he is never the nearer. This ſentiment is as hoſtile to the *native* juſtice and goodneſs of the law as any poſition Mr. T. has advanced. For as to what men are able to do *by the grace of* GOD, that is nothing to the purpoſe. In order to juſtify the law, it is neceſſary that we ſhould in ſome ſenſe be able to obey it, prior to, and independent of, the proviſions of the goſpel. To introduce the beſtowment of grace, in order to vindicate the equity of the law, is injurious to both Law and Goſpel: to the firſt, as ſuppoſing it in itſelf unjuſt; to the laſt as rendering it not grace but debt.—Suppoſe the king and parliament of Great-Britain ſhould enact a law, requiring the inhabitants of any particular town to pay *one thouſand pounds* annually by way of tax. At the time of the law being enacted, thoſe inhabitants were well able to pay it, and afterwards became poor and entirely unable. The government, however, ſtill continue the law in force, notwithſtanding their pecuniary inability.—But his royal highneſs the Prince of Wales, with the concurrence of his majeſty and parliament, graciouſly remits, or offers to remit to theſe poor inhabitants what ſhall be ſufficient for the payment of the tax. Quere, (1.) Does this remittance render the law which continued to require a thouſand pounds, when the inhabitants were unable to pay it, in *itſelf* juſt or good? (2.) Is it to the honour of the prince, any more than the king and parliament, to call ſuch a remittance by the name of *grace*, when its only purpoſe is to ſcreen the government from the charge of *injuſtice*?

‡ lx. 61.

injuſtice? I am perſuaded that ſuch a piece of conduct as Mr. T.'s ſyſtem aſcribes to the great GOD, is what the honourable characters before mentioned would ſcorn to be engaged in. Such a law undoubtedly ought to be repealed.—Should it be urged for its continuance, that it ſhould ſtand as it was, for the purpoſe of convincing the inhabitants of their *ſin* in not complying with it,† they would reply, 'Convince us of ſin? no, that it can never do, but rather convince us of its own cruelty and its maker's tyranny.'—But perhaps you have not done ſo much towards complying with it as you might have done. 'Be it ſo, this can be no proper mean of convincing us of *ſin*; let us have a law equal to our capacity, and then, ſo far as we fall ſhort of it, that will be a proper mean of conviction, but no other.'

The reader will not ſuppoſe that I am pleading for the repeal of God's law; I ſuppoſe men's natural abilities are ſtill equal to its demands: but my deſign is barely to ſhew, that according to the tendency of Mr. T.'s principles, the law cannot be either juſt or good, and the goſpel is not grace but debt.

Mr. T. often talks of his opponent taking his threefold argument, and anſwering it conjointly. When an author advances contrary poſitions, it is very difficult to know what are his real ſentiments; otherwiſe Mr. T. has ſufficiently anſwered himſelf. (1.) He allows that men are unable to keep GOD's law perfectly.‖ (2.) He will not pretend to ſay that they ever could ſo keep it ſince they were intelligent beings.* And (3.) What is more, he does not profeſs to hold that grace is provided ſufficient to enable them to keep it.‡ Here then all the three members of Mr. T.'s poſition concur reſpecting men's inability to keep the law perfectly.—"They could never avoid it, cannot deliver themſelves from it, and the bleſſed GOD has not made ſuch proviſion as is neceſſary to deliver them:"—and yet Mr. T. allows that they *ought* to keep it notwithſtanding,

† cxxix. 130. ‖ lix. 60. * lix. 60. ‡ lx. 61.

ſtanding,§ and it ſhould ſeem, their not keeping it is their *ſin*, of which the law is a proper mean to convince them.† The reader is here left to make his own reflections.

But " is it right for a man to be eternally puniſhed for what he could never poſſibly avoid?—This is the queſtion," ſays Mr. T. " to which I think Mr. F. with all his ingenious labour, has not attempted to give a direct anſwer.—Yet nothing is done, till a direct anſwer be given."‡ I reply, (1.) If there be any weight in Mr. T.'s reaſoning, it muſt affect *all* puniſhment as well as *eternal* puniſhment;* and if ſo, the ſentence of corporeal death, which has paſſed upon all men in conſequence of Adam's tranſgreſſion, and is executed upon millions who have never actually ſinned, muſt be an unrighteous ſentence. (2.) If man, as a fallen polluted creature, is blameleſs, he muſt, if juſtice be done him,

as

§ lix. 60. † cxxix. 130. ‡ li.

* My good opinion of Mr. T.'s integrity and piety, makes me utterly at a loſs how to account for the inſinuation in p. lxxxiv. 85, that it has been generally acknowledged by the " unhappy men" who deny the eternity of future puniſhment, and hold with " univerſal ſalvation, that *before* a man can be of their ſentiments, he muſt be a Calviniſt." To be ſure, neither I nor you can be certain, that no one perſon who embraced the general reſtitution ſcheme, was weak or wicked enough to drop ſuch an expreſſion; though I never heard of ſuch an inſtance. But to juſtify the manner in which this innuendo is brought in, it ought at leaſt to have been a common, repeated acknowledgment, made by ſome of the moſt eminent patrons of that ſyſtem. Surely the late *biſhop of Briſtol* was never led into it by *his* Calviniſm. Nor have I ever heard of Dr. *Prieſtley* or Dr. *Chauncey*, as ſuggeſting that this was the effect of their former Calviniſm. It is very evident that they were firſt far from Calviniſm before they eſpouſed that notion. I wiſh Mr. T. (if this paragraph could indeed be his writing, and was not added to his manuſcript by ſome unknown perſon devoid of conſcience, to blacken Calviniſm at any rate;) would favour us with the names of " theſe unhappy men who have ſo frequently ſaid" it. Were it needful, I could name a member of Mr. T.'s own church, who has pleaded for univerſal ſalvation, without being led into it by any previous Calviniſm.

But the *Monthly Review* for July 1789, has afforded an opportunity of appealing to Mr. T.'s conſcience ſtill more forcibly on this article. Does Mr. T. believe that the gentleman by whom he himſelf is there abuſed for his " ſulphureous diſcourſe" on the *eternity of future puniſhment*, could never have treated a ſcripture doctrine with ſo much contempt if the reviewer had not *once* been a *Calviniſt?!! Monthly Review*, p. 95.

as ſuch be unexpoſed to puniſhment either here or hereafter; and conſequently muſt, as ſuch, need no ſaviour at all. To ſpeak, therefore, of the fall as rendering a ſaviour neceſſary, as Mr. T. himſelf ſeems to do;* or to ſay with the apoſtle, that *as by one man's diſobedience many were made ſinners, ſo by the obedience of one ſhall many be made righteous*, muſt be altogether improper. But perhaps Mr. T. will ſtill complain of the want of a direct anſwer. Well, if another form will pleaſe him better, let it ſtand thus.

The fall and its neceſſary effects, are what Mr. T. calls unavoidable by us;—Chriſt, by laying down his life, delivered us from the fall and its neceſſary effects; Rom. v. 15--21. 1 Cor. xv. 22. 1 Theſſ. i. 10.—Chriſt died therefore to deliver us from that which Mr. T. calls unavoidable. But Chriſt would not have died to deliver us from a puniſhment which we never deſerved. I do conclude, therefore, that we deſerve everlaſting miſery for that which (in Mr. T.'s ſenſe of the word) is unavoidable.

I am, dear ſir,
Your's, &c.

LETTER VII.

Dear Sir,

THERE is one queſtion more which Mr. T. holds up in his vi. Letter, the deciſion of which goes a great way towards the deciding of the controverſy between you: this is *whether natural power is to all intents and purpoſes ſufficient to render us accountable beings in reſpect of moral or ſpiritual exerciſes?*

This queſtion I promiſed a while ago to diſcuſs before we had done. Before I enter upon it, however, let it be obſerved, that if natural power *is* ſufficient for the above purpoſe, and that antecedent to, and independent

* cxxxviii, cxli. 140, 142.

of, the beſtowment of grace, then five parts out of ſix, at leaſt, of Mr. T.'s iv, v, and vi Letters, are to no purpoſe. All his exclamations againſt men being required to perform what they have no *power* to accompliſh,—blamed for their omiſſion of it, &c. &c. entirely reſt upon the ſuppoſition that *natural* power is *not* power; or however not *ſuch* power, as to render men accountable for omitting moral and ſpiritual exerciſes. All Mr. T.'s exclamations likewiſe in his ix former Letters, upon the cruelty of puniſhing men *more ſeverely*, reſt upon this ſuppoſition, that *natural power* is of no account; for the cruelty againſt which he there exclaims, conſiſts in puniſhing men "for not doing what it never was in their power to do."* Now if the contrary of this can be proved, the body of Mr. T.'s ſyſtem will be overturned.

When you affirmed that "natural power is to all intents and purpoſes ſufficient to render men accountable beings," Mr. T. calls for *proof*,† yea, and ſuggeſts that you have acknowledged the contrary in p. 188 of your firſt treatiſe. Whether you have not proved this matter *already*, and whether Mr. T. has not *allowed* you to have proved it, we will now enquire.

(1.) You have proved that *natural ſtrength* is the *meaſure of men's obligation* to *love* GOD, being that rule according to which we are required to love him.—*Thou ſhalt* love Jehovah thy GOD with all—THY STRENGTH. (Firſt Treatiſe, p. 188--190.) To this Mr. T. has made no reply; but on the contrary, has allowed your reaſonings in thoſe pages to be "very concluſive."‡

(2.) You have proved that men are obliged to the performance of all duty, and are inexcuſable for their omiſſion of it, antecedent to, and independent of, the beſtowment of *grace*. (Reply, p. 50.) To this alſo, Mr. T. has made no reply; but on the contrary, has told us that he "wiſhes to oppoſe nothing contained in p. 50, ſo far as the preſent ſubject is concerned.§ Mr. T. therefore, has fully allowed you to have proved your

* lvii. 58. † lv. 56. ‡ ix Letters, 67. § lviii. 59.

your point, and consequently to have proved that the body of his own reasonings is fallacious. Surely Mr. T. must have engaged in a controversy which he does not sufficiently understand; how else could he allow of these sentiments, and at the same time maintain their opposites?

To the above arguments might be added, the universal *silence of scripture* in respect of the internal operations of grace being necessary to render men accountable beings, as to moral and spiritual exercises. The scripture is not silent upon what it is that renders us moral agents, but never, that I remember, gives us the least hint of *grace*, or the Spirit's operations being necessary to that end. Whenever God speaks of men in a way of *complaint*, or *censure*, he urges their enjoyment of natural powers, outward advantages, means, and opportunities, as what rendered it fit and reasonable for better things to have been expected at their hands. Rehearsing what he had done for Israel, and complaining of their ungrateful returns, he says, *What was there more to be done to my vineyard, that I have not done in it? Wherefore when I looked that it should bring forth grapes, brought it forth wild grapes?* Isa. v. 1--7. It is plain here that God reckoned himself to have done enough for them to warrant an expectation, speaking after the manner of men, of better returns; and yet here is no mention of anything but external privileges, means, and opportunities, which were bestowed upon them.—It is true, God is said to have *given his good Spirit to instruct them*; but the meaning of that is, he inspired his servants the prophets, and sent them with repeated messages of instruction; or, as it is explained in the same place, *He testified against them by his Spirit in the prophets*. Neh. ix. 20, 30. These messages and messengers were, what Stephen accused them with having *always resisted*. *Which of the prophets*, said he, *have not your fathers persecuted?* and this he justly calls a *resistance of the Holy Spirit*. Acts vii. 51, 52. When Christ complained of *Chorazin* and *Bethsaida*, he made no mention of the *internal* operations of his grace, as the

ground of his juſt expectations, but barely of the *mighty works* which he had wrought among them. Matt. xi. 20--24. So when the apoſtle pronounces the heathen to be *without excuſe*, and informs us wherefore they were ſo, he makes no mention of grace which they either had, or might have had, but of the evidence afforded to them by the viſible creation, by which he intimates the inviſible power and Godhead of its creator might have been known, had they been but of a right temper of mind. Rom. i. 19, 26.*

But Mr. T. thinks you have contradicted all this by aſſerting, that "natural ability is *not* of itſelf ſufficient for the performance of good." Cannot Mr, T. then diſcern the difference between what is ſufficient to render us *accountable beings*, and what is ſufficient for the *actual performance* of good? If a man is poſſeſſed of reaſon and conſcience, he has that, which to all intents and purpoſes, renders him an accountable being, and any court upon earth would treat him as reſponſible for any truſt which might be repoſed in his hands; but if he is not poſſeſſed of *integrity*, he has not that in him which is ſufficient for the ſecurity of his maſter's property, or any ſervice which is truly virtuous.

I am, dear ſir,

Your's, &c.

LETTER VIII.

Dear Sir,

ANOTHER queſtion in debate between you and Mr. T. is, *Whether faith in Chriſt be a requirement of the moral law?* On this ſubject Mr. T. has written his vii and viii Letters. If I underſtand the force of this queſtion in the preſent controverſy, it is this, that it involves the doctrine of a proviſion of grace in order to make it equitable. Mr. T. conſiders faith as an additional obligation to thoſe required by the moral law, and

* See Bellamy's True Religion Delineated, p. 121--127.

and therefore thinks it an hard and inequitable requirement if grace is not provided to enable us to comply. (ix Lett. 45.)

On this ſubject Mr. T. admits that "the moral law—demands, that whatever is revealed in the goſpel or any other diſpenſation, be received by all rational creatures to whom that revelation is made."* This is all, I think, that you have pleaded for. You do not ſuppoſe the moral law *expreſsly*, but *radically*, or *remotely* to require faith in Chriſt. You only contend, that *that love* which the moral law expreſsly requires would lead a perſon poſſeſſed of it, to embrace the goſpel.—And herein, it ſeems, you are agreed.

But Mr. T. appears to think it very improper on this account to ſay, that faith in Chriſt is a requirement of the moral law; as improper as to ſay, that *Circumciſion*, *Baptiſm*, and the *Lord's-Supper*, are requirements of that law, on account of their being *remotely* required by it.† In ſhort, he ſeems to conſider faith in Chriſt as a part of poſitive law, and therefore, not ſtrictly ſpeaking, moral. To which it is replied,—

Suppoſing faith in Chriſt to be a part of poſitive law, yet if compliance with it is juſtly "demanded by the moral law," which Mr. T. ſays it is, then it would not follow, that it is ſuch an additional obligation on men, as to require additional grace in order to render it equitable. But farther,

If I underſtand the nature of *poſitive* law as diſtinguiſhed from *moral*, it is that which ariſes not from the *nature of things*, but from the *mere will* of the lawgiver. There is no one *poſitive* law with which I am acquainted, but what it would have been equally as conſiſtent with the moral character of GOD to have enjoined the oppoſite, as the thing itſelf. But it is not ſo with reſpect to *moral* obligations, they are ſuch as it would be contrary to the moral character of GOD not to require them, or to require their oppoſites. Now

 ſurely

* lxviii. 69. † lxix. 70.

ſurely the requirement of faith in Chriſt, where the goſpel is proclaimed, has *this* property attending it. It would be inconſiſtent with the perfections of GOD to allow men to reject the goſpel of his Son, or to feel indifferent towards it.

Surely Mr. T. is greatly miſtaken, in ſuppoſing that whatever is ſtrictly moral is univerſally and alike binding in all times, places, and circumſtances.* Obedience to parents, and love to children, with many other duties of the moral law, are binding on perſons who have parents to obey, and children to love, but not on thoſe who have none. The anſwers to your arguments, in Letter viii, proceed upon this miſtaken ſuppoſition, and therefore require no other reply than the above.

Mr. T. in the beginning of his viith Letter takes pains to reconcile his admitting the law to be "an infallible teſt of right and wrong," and, at the ſame time, affirming that "final miſery is not brought upon ſinners by their tranſgreſſion of the law, but by their rejection of the overtures of mercy.† In the *firſt* of theſe ſentiments you are both agreed. As to the *laſt*, you admit that the rejection of mercy *aggravates* men's deſtruction, and therefore is a *cauſe* of it, which the ſcriptures he has cited‡ undoubtedly prove; but that ſinners periſh *merely* for rejecting the goſpel, and *not for tranſgreſſing the law*, wants proof. Perhaps it might be much eaſier proved, that men will not be puniſhed for rejecting the goſpel, any farther than as ſuch rejection involves in it a tranſgreſſion of the law. Mr. T. complains§ of your ſuppoſing, "that he makes the goſpel a new ſyſtem of government taking place of the moral law, and is perſuaded you had no authority for ſuch a ſuppoſition."—And yet without this ſuppoſition, I do not ſee the force of what he labours to illuſtrate and eſtabliſh as above. If Mr. T. here means anything different from what you admit, it muſt be to maintain that the death of Chriſt has, in ſuch ſort, atoned for the ſins of the whole world, as that no man ſhall be finally condemned for his breaking the moral law, but merely

* lxx. 71. † lxiv—lxviii. 65—68. ‡ lxv. 66. § lxxvi. 77.

merely for the ſin of unbelief. If this is not his meaning, I aſk his pardon for miſunderſtanding him. If it is, this is to all intents and purpoſes making the goſpel a new ſyſtem of government taking place of the moral law.

It may, in a ſenſe, be ſaid of a rebel who refuſes to lay down his arms and ſubmit to mercy, (which is a caſe more in point than that of a condemned criminal in the hands of juſtice,) that when he comes to be puniſhed, he will die becauſe he refuſed the king's pardon; but it is eaſy to ſee the word *becauſe* is in this connection uſed improperly. It does not mean that the refuſal of mercy is the crime, and the only crime, for which he ſuffers; no, this is not the direct or procuring, ſo much as the *occaſional* cauſe of his puniſhment. REBELLION is that for which he ſuffers; and his refuſal of mercy is no farther a procuring cauſe of it, than as it is a perſeverance in *rebellion*, and as it were, the completion of it.

I am, dear ſir,
Your's, &c.

LETTER IX.

Dear Sir,

THE laſt article in debate between you and Mr. Taylor, concerns *the extent of Chriſt's death*. On this ſubject you ſtated your own views by way of explanation;—offered evidence that Chriſt in his vicarious ſufferings and death had an abſolute determination to ſave ſome of the human race;—noticed Mr. T.'s arguments;—endeavoured to ſhew the conſiſtency of a limitation of deſign in the death of Chriſt with the indefinite call of the goſpel, &c.—and concluded with ſome general reflections upon the whole. On theſe ſubjects Mr. T. has followed you, and I ſhall attempt to follow him, with a few additional remarks.

In

In ſtating your ſenſe of the limited extent of Chriſt's death, you admitted that the ſufferings of Chriſt were ſufficient for the ſalvation of the whole world, had the race of mankind, or the multitude of their offences, been a thouſand times more numerous than they are, if it had pleaſed GOD to render them effectual to that end. You do not conſider the neceſſity of an atonement as ariſing from the number of ſins, but from the nature of them. As the ſame *ſin* which is neceſſary to enlighten the preſent inhabitants of the earth, is ſufficient to enlighten many millions more; and as the ſame perfect *obedience* of CHRIST, which was neceſſary for the Juſtification of one ſinner, is ſufficient to juſtify the millions that are ſaved; ſo you apprehend, the ſame infinite *atonement* would have been neceſſary for the ſalvation of one ſoul, conſiſtently with juſtice, as for the ſalvation of a world.

You admit that "the death of Chriſt has opened a way whereby GOD can forgive any ſinner whatever, who returns to him by Jeſus Chriſt," and that in perfect conſiſtency with the honour of the ſupreme law-giver, and the general good of his extenſive empire. "If we were to ſuppoſe, for argument's ſake, that all the inhabitants of the globe ſhould thus return," you do not conceive that "one ſoul need be ſent away for want of a ſufficiency in the death of Chriſt, to render their pardon and acceptance conſiſtent with the rights of juſtice."* All the limitation you maintain in the death of Chriſt, ariſes from pure *ſovereignty*; it is a limitation of *deſign*.

Now, ſeeing the above is conceded, whence ariſes the propriety of all thoſe arguments in Mr. T.'s piece, which proceed upon the ſuppoſition of the contrary? The latter part of his *Ninth Letter*, which is taken up in expoſing the conſequences of maintaining an indefinite invitation without an *univerſal proviſion*, overlooks the above conceſſions. You have admitted the neceſſity of an univerſal proviſion, as a ground of invitation, and

* Mr. Fuller's Defence againſt the Obſervations of Philanthropos. 64.

and that in *two* reſpects.—1. A proviſion of pardon in behalf of all thoſe who ſhall believe in Chriſt. 2. A proviſion of means and motives to induce them to believe. You declare, "If no more than this were meant by the term *proviſion*, you ſhould not object to it."* And if by *Chriſt's dying for the whole world* were meant no more than this, you would not wiſh to have any diſpute about it. Now if Mr. T. had been diſpoſed to attend to *things*, and not merely to *words*, and to keep to the point in hand, he ſhould have proved that *this proviſion* which *you* admitted, was inſufficient to render the invitations of the goſpel conſiſtent, and have pointed out wherein the proviſion for which he pleads has the advantage of it. Mr. T. was reminded of this in your *third general reflection*;† but I do not recollect that he has taken any notice of it.

I do not ſee, I confeſs, but that the Parable of the Marriage Feaſt, Matt. xxii. 4, 5, is as conſiſtent with your hypotheſis as with his.‡ You never ſuppoſed but that *all things* were *ready*; or that even thoſe who *made light of it*, if they had come in GOD's way, would have been diſappointed. All you ſuppoſe is, that proviſion was not made effectually to perſuade every one to embrace it; and that without ſuch effectual perſuaſion no one ever did, or will embrace GOD's way of ſalvation.

Mr. T. proceeds to draw ſome concluſions, which he thinks very unfavourable to your ſentiments. "We have no authority," ſays he, "on this ſcheme, to aſcribe the limitation to any cauſe *but want of love*." This, he apprehends, is highly derogatory to the honour of GOD, eſpecially as *love* is his darling attribute.‖ But all this reaſoning proceeds upon the ſuppoſition, that GOD muſt be accuſed of want of love to his rebellious creatures, unleſs he does all that for their ſalvation which he *could* do conſiſtently with juſtice. Now, let it be obſerved, Mr. T. ſometimes tells us, he does not oppoſe the doctrine of an abſolute determination for the

* Mr. Fuller's Defence againſt the Obſervations of Philanthropos. 89, 99. † Idem, 101, 102. ‡ Taylor, cxxxiii. 134. ‖ lxxix. 80.

the ſalvation of ſome of the human race.§ But if he admit *this* as conſiſtent with what he has advanced, then he muſt admit that God *could* have actually ſaved the whole world in the ſame abſolute way, and not have ſuffered any of the human race to periſh, and all this too, in conſiſtency with Juſtice. And yet he does not. —What then? According to Mr. T. all muſt be aſcribed to *want of Love*. Farther, Mr. T. I ſhould think, will not deny that God *could* have ſpread the goſpel, and that conſiſtently both with his own juſtice, and with man's free-agency, all over the earth, and at every period of time ſince the fall of man, and yet he has not. Yea, before the coming of his Son, he ſuffered all nations but one, for many ages, to walk in their own ways; this, according to Mr. T.'s reaſonings, muſt all be aſcribed to *want of love*, and ſo lie as a reproach upon God's character.*

Mr.

§ xci. 92.

* An objection much like the above was once urged by Mr. Weſley againſt Mr. Hervey—"Will God," ſaid Mr. W. "deny what is neceſſary for the preſent comfort and final acceptance of any one ſoul that he has made? Would *you* deny it to any if it were in *your* power?"—To which the ingenious Mr. Hervey replied, "To ſhew "the error of ſuch a ſentiment, and the fallacy of ſuch reaſoning, I "ſhall juſt mention a recent melancholy fact:—News is brought, "that the *Prince George* man of war, Admiral *Broderick's* own ſhip, "is burnt and ſunk, and above four hundred ſouls, that were on "board, are periſhed. Six hours the flames prevailed; while every "means were uſed to preſerve the ſhip and crew; but all to no pur- "poſe. In the mean time, ſhrieks and groans, bitter moanings and "piercing cries, were heard from every quarter. Raving, deſpair, "and even madneſs, preſented themſelves in a variety of forms. "Some ran to and fro, diſtracted with terror, not knowing what they "did, or what they ſhould do. Others jumped overboard from all "parts; and to avoid the purſuit of one death, leaped into the jaws "of another. Thoſe unhappy wretches who could not ſwim, were "obliged to remain upon the wreck, though flakes of fire fell on "their bodies. Soon the maſts went away and killed numbers. "Thoſe who were not killed thought themſelves happy to get upon "the floating timber. Nor yet were they ſafe; for, the fire having "communicated itſelf to the guns, which were loaded, and ſhotted, "they ſwept multitudes from this their laſt refuge.—What ſay you, "ſir, to this diſmal narrative? Does not your heart bleed? Would "*you* have ſtood by, and denied *your* ſuccour, if it had been in your "power to help?—Yet the Lord ſaw this extreme diſtreſs. He "heard their piteous moans. He was able to ſave them, yet with- "drew his aſſiſtance. Now becauſe you would gladly have ſuccoured "them if you could, and God Almighty could but would not "ſend them aid; will you therefore conclude that you are above your

Mr. T.'s own ſcheme, as well as your's, ſuppoſes that GOD does *not* do *all that* for *ſome* men which he *could*, and which is neceſſary to their ſalvation. *He* ſuppoſes, that if what was done for Chorazin, Bethſaida and Capernaum without effect, had been done for Tyre, Sidon and Sodom it would have been effectual.† And yet this was not done. To what is this to be imputed? Surely GOD could have ſent the goſpel to the one as well as to the other. I ſee not what cauſe Mr. T. will find to impute this to, but what he calls a *want of love*.

But Mr. T. ſuggeſts that the conduct of our bleſſed Saviour, according to your ſcheme, would reſemble that of a perſon, who ſhould invite another to an entertainment, without a *deſign* that he ſhould partake of it.‡ But if a compariſon muſt be made, ought it not rather to be with a perſon who ſincerely invites his neighbours to a plentiful banquet, and never deſigned any other but that whoever comes ſhall be entertained with a hearty welcome; but did not deſign, after all fair means were uſed, and repeated inſults received, to do all that perhaps he could, to overcome their pride and prejudice, and ſo bring them to the entertainment. If this would deſtroy the ſincerity of the invitation, ſo would *foreknowledge*; and it might as plauſibly be objected, How can any Being act ſincerely in inviting men to partake of *that* which he knows, at the ſame time, they never will enjoy?

Mr. T.'s ſcheme appears to him to have many advantages; particularly he thinks it is conſiſtent with the general tenor of ſcripture;—clears the conduct of the Father of mercies from the appearance of cruelty;—and leaves the obdurate ſinner juſtly condemned. But admitting, for argument's ſake, that the divine conduct is thereby cleared of the appearance of cruelty, the worſt is, that *this is all*. His ſcheme barely goes to vindicate

" LORD? and that your *loving-kindneſs* is greater than his? I will " not offer to charge any ſuch conſequence upon you. I am per- " ſuaded you abhor the thought." *Letters to Mr. Weſley*, p. 288, 289.

† xxiii. 25. ‡ lxxxiii. 84.

vindicate the Almighty from *cruelty*. It is *juſtice* only, there is no *grace* in it, nothing that GOD had a right to with-hold. That which we have hitherto called the GRACE of the goſpel, amounts then to no more than *this*, it beſtows a benefit upon intelligent creatures, without which they could not poſſibly avoid being everlaſtingly miſerable; and that upon this conſideration, that "they did not bring this miſery upon themſelves, nor was it ever in their power to avoid it."* If the Divine Being will do this, he ſhall be complimented with the character of *benevolent*;† but if not, he muſt be reproached, "as not *loving* but *hating* a great part of his rational offspring."—O, Mr. *Taylor!* does any one maintain that men, conſidered as the *offspring* of GOD, are the objects of his hatred? Do not *men* ſuſtain a more diſagreeable character than *this*? That Deiſts and Socinians ſhould write in this ſtrain, is no wonder; but how came the language of infidelity to eſcape your pen?

You will excuſe this apoſtrophe, as I know you unite with me in a perſonal reſpect and eſteem for your opponent, though you utterly diſapprove of his Arminian tenets, which, under the plauſible pretext of *extending* the grace of the goſpel, *enervate* if not *annihilate* it, and leave little or nothing of GRACE but the name.

I am, dear ſir,
Your's, &c.

LETTER X.

Dear Sir,

MR. T. in his ixth Letter remarks, on the evidence you offered for an *abſolute determination* in the death of Chriſt to *ſave ſome* of the human race.—This ſentiment, Mr. T. ſays, "whether true or falſe, he does not wiſh to oppoſe."‡ He would not diſpute with you,

* lxxx. 81. † lxxix. 80. ‡ xci. 92.

you, it ſeems, about Chriſt's dying with a view to the certain ſalvation of ſome, provided you would admit that, in another reſpect, he died *for all mankind*. Here then you ſeem to come nearer together than you are ſometimes. The ſenſe in which he pleads for the univerſal extent of Chriſt's death, is only to lay a foundation for this *doctrine*, that *men in general may be ſaved if they will*; and this is what you admit; you allow that the death of Chriſt has opened a way, whereby GOD can, conſiſtently with his juſtice, forgive any ſinner whatever, who returns to him by Jeſus Chriſt; and if this may be called dying for men, which I ſhall not diſpute, then it is admitted, that Chriſt died for all mankind. But you ſay, *they will not come to Chriſt for life*, and that if Chriſt had died for no other end, than to give them this offer, not one of them would have accepted it.

You hold as much as Mr. T. holds to any good purpoſe. You admit of a *way* being opened for the ſalvation of ſinners without diſtinction; and you hold *more*, viz. that an effectual proviſion is made in the death of Chriſt, that *that way* ſhall *not* be *unoccupied*;—that he ſhall ſee of the travel of his ſoul, and be ſatisfied.—Without *this* proviſion, you ſuppoſe *no one* would ever have been ſaved; and the tendency of your reaſoning is to prove that *all* who *are* ſaved, are ſaved in conſequence of it.

Mr. T. I obſerve, is not diſpoſed to controvert the doctrine of eternal, perſonal, and unconditional election with you.* I am allowed, therefore, to take that doctrine, together with a ſpecial deſign in the death of Chriſt for the ſalvation of the elect, for granted. "This ſentiment," Mr. T. ſays, "whether true or falſe, he does not wiſh to oppoſe." If anything is neceſſary to be *proved* in this place, it is, that NONE *but thoſe whoſe ſalvation Chriſt abſolutely deſigned in his death, are eventually ſaved*; or in other words, *that* WHOEVER *are ſaved, are indebted to ſovereign and efficacious grace for their ſalvation*. Now let the reader only turn to p. 73,

* xcix. 100.

74, of your *Reply to Philanthropos*, and he will perceive that ſeveral of thoſe ſcriptures which prove the doctrine of election, prove alſo that *none elſe are finally ſaved.* The apoſtles addreſſed *all* the believing Epheſians, Theſſalonians, &c. as having been *choſen in Chriſt* before the foundation of the world, that they ſhould be holy; —as *choſen to ſalvation* through ſanctification of the Spirit, and belief of the truth;—as *elect according to the foreknowledge of* GOD *the Father, through ſanctification of the Spirit unto obedience*;—as being *ſaved and called with an holy calling*, not according to their works, but *according to* GOD'*s own purpoſe and grace, given them in Chriſt before the world began.*—But if SOME were ſaved in conſequence of ſuch a purpoſe in their favour, and OTHERS without it, the apoſtles had no juſt grounds to write as they did, concerning them all, without diſtinction. When we are told, that *as many as were ordained to eternal life believed*, this implies as ſtrongly as anything can imply, that *no more* believed, and were ſaved, than ſuch as were ordained to eternal life. Chriſt returned thanks to his Father that he had *hid theſe things from the wiſe and prudent, and revealed them unto babes; even ſo Father*, ſaid he, *for it ſeemed good in thy ſight.*—And again, we are aſſured by the apoſtle Paul, *The election hath obtained it, and the reſt were blinded.**

To the above paſſages I ſhall only add one more, 1 Cor. i. 26--29. *Ye ſee your calling, brethren, how that not many wiſe men after the fleſh, not many mighty, not many noble are* CALLED; *but* GOD *hath* CHOSEN *the fooliſh things of the world to confound the wiſe; and* GOD *hath choſen the weak things of the world, to confound the things that are mighty; and baſe things of the world, and things which are deſpiſed, hath* GOD *choſen, and things which are not, to bring to nought things that are: that no fleſh ſhould glory in his preſence.*—The reaſoning of the apoſtle in this paſſage, plainly ſuppoſes the following things:—1. That there is a *ſpecial* and *effectual vocation*, which is peculiar to all chriſtians.—The *common* call of the goſpel extends

* Eph. i. 4. 2 Theſſ. ii. 13. 1 Pet. i. 9. Acts xiii. 48. Matt. xi. 25. Rom. xi. 7.

extends alike to rich and poor, wiſe and fooliſh, noble and ignoble, but the *effectual* operations of the Holy Spirit do not; it is the latter therefore, and not the former, which is here meant. 2. That this vocation, common to all true chriſtians, correſponds as to the objects of it, with election.—The ſame perſons, and *all* of them, ſaid to be *called*, are in the ſame paſſage ſaid to be *choſen*; which agrees with the ſame apoſtle's account of the matter, in Rom. viii. 30. *Whom he did predeſtinate, them he alſo called.*—3. Vocation not only correſponds with election as to the objects of it, but is itſelf an *effect* of it.—The reaſon given why the fooliſh, weak, and deſpiſed ones of the world were called, rather than others, is GOD's ſovereign *choice* of them before others. Some might have ſuppoſed, if the apoſtle had not been ſo particular in his expreſſions, that the minds of the weak and illiterate, though under a diſadvantage in one reſpect, yet, poſſeſſed an advantage in another, in that they were more free from prejudice; and that Paul had meant to aſcribe their embracing Chriſt before others, to the unprejudiced ſtate of their minds; but ſuch a ſuppoſition is entirely precluded, by the apoſtle's language. He does not ſay, the weak and fooliſh have *choſen* GOD, but GOD hath *choſen them*; nor would the other mode of expreſſion have correſponded with the end aſſigned, to prove that *no fleſh ſhall glory in his preſence.*

Many worthy men, who have maintained the Calviniſtic doctrine of Predeſtination, have, at the ſame time, admitted, that Chriſt might be ſaid, in ſome ſenſe, to have died for the whole world. They diſtinguiſhed between the *ſufficiency* and *efficiency* of his death; and conſidered the indefinite language of the New Teſtament, relative to that ſubject, as expreſſing the former of theſe ideas. Thus the Engliſh reformers, who compoſed the xxxix Articles, appear to have viewed the ſubject. They fully avowed the doctrine of Predeſtination, and, at the ſame time, ſpake of Chriſt's dying for all mankind. Mr. T. on this ground affirms, that "The doctrine of the univerſality of our Saviour's

death both is, and ever ſince the reformation, has been, the doctrine of the eſtabliſhed church."* I believe, in the ſenſe above mentioned, it has been ſo; and if this was all that Mr. T. pleaded for, he might debate the point with whomſoever he pleaſed, I ſhould not intereſt myſelf in the diſpute. But the views of CRANMER, LATIMER, HOOPER, USHER, and DAVENANT, were very different from thoſe of Mr. *Taylor*. They, as well as FRASER, of *Scotland*, and BELLAMY, of *New-England*, and many other anti-epiſcopalian divines, who have agreed with them in this point, never imagined that any beſides the elect would finally be ſaved. And they conſidered the ſalvation of all that are ſaved, as the effect of predeſtinating grace, as their works abundantly teſtify.

Mr. T. may ſay, the queſtion is not whether more than thoſe, whoſe ſalvation is abſolutely determined, *will be* eventually ſaved, but whether they *might be*. "If," ſays he, "any ſuch election be maintained, as ſuppoſes that all the reſt of mankind never enjoyed the poſſibility of happineſs, nor had any proviſion of happineſs made for them, but were neceſſarily, either from eternity, or from their birth, expoſed to eternal miſery, ſuch election as this, I deliberately conſider as oppoſite to the ſpirit and deſign of the goſpel, and to the tenor of ſcripture."† To this it is replied, All ſuch terms as *neceſſary*, *cannot*, *impoſſible*, &c. when applied to theſe ſubjects, are uſed improperly. They always denote, in ſtrict propriety of ſpeech, an obſtruction ariſing from ſomething diſtinct from the ſtate of the will. Such terms, in their common acceptation, *ſuppoſe a willingneſs* in us to perform an action, or obtain an end, but that we are hindered by ſome unſurmountable bar from without. Such an idea is always annexed to the uſe of ſuch terms; and Mr. T. certainly has this idea in his uſe of the terms *neceſſary* and *impoſſible* in this place. His meaning is to oppoſe that doctrine, which repreſents a part of mankind as placed in ſuch circumſtances, as that though they ſhould be willing to embrace Chriſt, or

* cxl. 141. † xcix. 100.

or at leaſt, willing to uſe means that they may be willing to embrace him, yet it would be all in vain. But ſuch a doctrine nobody maintains; at leaſt I dare ſay, his opponent had no ſuch ideas of the ſubject. You have no ſuch notion of election, or of the limited extent of Chriſt's death, as that it ſhall be in vain for any of the ſons of men *truly* to *ſeek* after GOD. If they are *willing* to be ſaved *in GOD's way*, nothing ſhall hinder their ſalvation; and if there were any meaning in the expreſſion, if they were but truly willing to uſe means that they might be willing, all would be clear before them. Now where this is the caſe, it cannot be ſaid, in ſtrict propriety of ſpeech, that no *proviſion* is made for their happineſs; or that any man's ſalvation is *impoſſible*, or his deſtruction *neceſſary*, ſeeing the way of ſalvation is open to him, if he will but walk in it.—All that can be ſaid in truth is, that there is a CERTAINTY in theſe things. It is *certain*, none will be ſaved but thoſe who chooſe to be ſaved in GOD's way. It is *certain*, that no one will chooſe, that which is oppoſite to the prevailing byas of his heart. Yea, it is *certain*, that whatever means there may be, adapted to the turning of his heart, a man who is *wholly* averſe to GOD, will never make uſe of them, with ſuch a deſign. To make uſe of a mean with a view to accompliſh an end, muſt imply the exiſtence of a deſire after that end; but a deſire after *this* end exiſts not till the end is accompliſhed. A deſire after a change of heart, is, in ſome degree, the very thing deſired.—Beſides if, as Mr. T. ſays, "men have no *will*, nor *power*, nor any concern about the matter" of believing in Chriſt, "till the Holy Spirit work, awaken, and produce theſe in the mind,"* then it is *certain*, even from his own premiſes, that no ſinner ever ſincerely applied to GOD for grace, before he had it, unleſs he could be ſuppoſed ſo to apply without will or power or any concern about it.—Theſe things, I ſay, are *certain*, according to the nature and conſtitution of all intelligent beings; and there are other things equally certain as

* xxi. 23.

conſequences of them, and which are confirmed by ſcripture teſtimony. It is *certain* none are willing to be ſaved in GOD's way, but thoſe who are made willing in the day of his power. It is certain whenever GOD makes a ſinner willing in the day of his power, he is only working things after the counſel of his own will, executing his own eternal purpoſe:—and hence it is *certain*, that ſuch, and only ſuch, will eventually be ſaved.

If Mr. T. objects againſt the *certainty* of any man's deſtruction, and will have it that this amounts to the ſame thing as *neceſſity* and *impoſſibility*, let him conſider, that as he admits the doctrine of divine *foreknowledge*, he muſt allow therefore that GOD certainly foreknew the final ſtate of every man. But certain foreknowledge muſt imply a *certainty* of the event foreknown. If an event is certainly foreknown, the future exiſtence of that event muſt be certain. If there was an uncertainty reſpecting the future exiſtence of an event, there muſt in the nature of things be an equal degree of uncertainty in the foreknowledge of that event. Certain foreknowledge, therefore, implies a certainty of the event foreknown.

But foreknowledge, it is alledged, has no *cauſal influence* upon the thing foreknown.† Be it ſo, neither has any purpoſe in GOD that you embrace, any influence towards a ſinner's deſtruction, except in a way of puniſhment for his ſin. "The ſcheme Mr. T. oppoſes, ſo far from repreſenting man as for ever unable to improve one ſingle mercy of GOD to any real good purpoſe," repreſents him as not only poſſeſſing great advantages, but as able to comply with every thing that GOD requires at his hand; and that all his miſery ariſes from his "*voluntary*" abuſe of mercy, and his *wilful* rebellion againſt GOD. It is not a want of *ability*, but of *inclination*, that proves his ruin.* If Mr. T. had

† cvii. 108.

* Though Mr. T. talks of men as having "no *will* nor *power* to believe in Chriſt, nor any concern in the matter," prior to the Spirit's work;

had kept theſe things in view, which ſurely he ought to have done, he could not have repreſented your ſentiments in ſuch a light as he has done.†

I am, dear ſir,

Your's, &c.

LETTER XI.

Dear Sir,

MR. T. often ſpeaks of the language of ſcripture, as if its whole current was in his favour; as if his opponent was engaged in a controverſy in which he had forſaken the word of GOD. Now ſuppoſe it were allowed, that the language of ſeveral paſſages of ſcripture, taken in their moſt literal and plain meaning, proves Chriſt in ſome ſenſe to have died for all mankind; ſtill if we will give fair ſcope to *other parts of ſcripture*, it appears evident, that in ſome ſenſe, he died for only a part of mankind. Several of theſe paſſages you had produced, and to which Mr. T. has ſaid ſcarcely any thing that deſerves being called an anſwer.

When you argued from Chriſt's being ſaid to *lay down his life for his ſheep;—to give himſelf for his church, that he might ſanctify it*, &c. &c. could Mr. T. think it ſufficient to ſay, "We are no where informed that he died for theſe *only*, this is no proof that he did not die for all mankind. It is certain if Chriſt died for all, he died for theſe, becauſe the greater number includes the leſs, and the whole includes its parts."*—Did not you argue

work; (xxi. 23.) yet that is what *you* have never affirmed. On the contrary, you maintain, that men have the ſame *power*, ſtrictly ſpeaking, before they are wrought upon by the Holy Spirit, as after; and before converſion as after:—that the work of the Spirit endows us with no new rational powers, or any powers that are neceſſary to moral agency:—and that ſo far from our having "no concern in the matter," we were all deeply *concerned* in *rejecting* Chriſt, and the way of ſalvation by him.

† cv. cvii. 106, 108.

* xcii. 93.—Go, preach the goſpel, ſaid Chriſt, to every creature; *he that believeth and is baptized ſhall be ſaved.*—"Believers *only*," ſay the Baptiſts,

argue particularly from *Epheſ.* v. 25, 26, that the death of Chriſt is there repreſented as the *reſult* of his love to the church in the character of an huſband, and which muſt therefore be *diſcriminating*;—that the *church* here, could not mean actual believers, becauſe they are conſidered as *unſanctified*. He died *that he might* ſanctify them;—that Chriſt did not die for believers as ſuch, he laid down his life for his *enemies*;—that therefore it muſt mean all the ELECT of GOD, all thoſe that are finally ſaved?—And has Mr. T. anſwered this reaſoning? No, nor attempted it. If, as he often ſuggeſts, your cauſe has ſo very ſlender a ſhare of ſcripture evidence to ſupport it, is it not a pity but he had given a fair anſwer to thoſe ſcriptures which were adduced?

You argued farther, from Chriſt's dying in the character of a *ſurety*, that he might *bring many ſons unto glory*;—might *gather together in one the children of* GOD *that were ſcattered abroad*, &c. &c. Mr. T.'s anſwer to this argument is exceedingly trifling and unfair, as any reader may ſee who will compare both together.‡ You did not "take for granted" that Chriſt abſolutely intended the ſalvation of all for whom he died, but brought the argument which he quotes in order to prove it. Nor did you reſt your argument from the paſſages of ſcripture there cited, upon your "*apprehenſions*," but upon the *ſcriptures themſelves*, which ſurely prove none the leſs for being introduced in that form.—Mr. T.'s remark upon the *Jewiſh ſacrifices*,† ſhews an uncommon inattention to the argument. You obſerved, by

Baptiſts, "you ſee are to be baptized."—'No,' ſay others, 'this is no proof that believers *only* are to be baptized. It might be the deſign of Chriſt that they ſhould baptize all the world for aught this paſſage proves. It is certain, if *all* are to be baptized, *believers* are, becauſe the greater number always includes the leſs, and the whole includes its parts.'—What would Mr. T. as a Baptiſt, ſay to this reaſoning? It is exactly the ſame as his own. This very anſwer you made to Mr. T. before, (78.) when he called out for *expreſs teſtimony* for what you ſuppoſed to be a *negative* truth; which anſwer of your's, I preſume he *totally miſunderſtood*, otherwiſe he could not have given a reply ſo foreign from the argument. cviii. 109.

‡ *Fuller's* Reply, 69. *Taylor's* xiii Letters, xciii. 94.

† xciv. 95.

by way of introduction, that "ſacrifices were offered on account of thoſe, and thoſe only, on whoſe behalf they were *ſanctified*, or ſet apart;—that every ſacrifice had its ſpecial appointment, and was ſuppoſed to atone for the ſins of thoſe, and thoſe only, on whoſe behalf it was offered."* All this you ſuppoſed would be granted you by your opponent. Theſe obſervations were your *data*. You then proceeded to apply this reaſoning, and to prove who thoſe were for whom Chriſt was *ſanctified*, or ſet apart as a ſacrifice. For this purpoſe you quoted John xvii. 19. *For their ſakes I ſanctify myſelf, that they alſo may be ſanctified through the truth:—they* who were *given him* of the Father, 9. But Mr. T. inſtead of anſwering this argument, never looks at it, but takes up a part of your *premiſes* without touching upon your concluſion, and then charges you with "reaſoning in a circle"! Conſidering Mr. T.'s abilities, and experience in polemical divinity, is it not aſtoniſhing, that things ſo indigeſted ſhould proceed from his pen?

You farther argued from the certain *effects* of Chriſt's death extending not to all mankind, particularly that of *redemption*. Mr. T.'s anſwer to this argument is abundantly more worthy of notice than to thoſe that went before.‡ Nor ſhall I urge it upon him, that his denial of *general redemption* while he pleads for the *univerſal extent of Chriſt's death*, indicates an idea of redemption as *novel* and unprecedented, as your interpretation of the term *propitiation*, which he endeavours to explode on account of its peculiarity.† Yet after all, there is great reaſon from the context, to conclude, that what is ſpoken in Gal. iii. 13. of Chriſt's having *redeemed us from the curſe of the law, being made a curſe for us*, reſpects what was effected by the blood of Chriſt *alone*, when upon the croſs, antecedent to our believing in him. When the apoſtle ſpeaks of *redemption*, he ſays, he *hath* redeemed us, *being made a curſe for us*; when he ſpeaks of bleſſings reſulting from his death, but which do not take place before believing, he immediately changes his

* *Fuller's* Reply, 69, 70. ‡ xciv. 95. † cxiv. 115, 116.

his manner of ſpeaking, as in verſe 14, That the bleſſing of Abraham *might* come on the Gentiles through Jeſus Chriſt;—that we *might* receive the promiſe of the Spirit through faith.—We are alſo ſaid to be *juſtified* THROUGH the *redemption* that is in Chriſt Jeſus. Rom. iii. 24. but would it not be making the apoſtle ſpeak very awkwardly, to underſtand redemption not of what was obtained by the death of Chriſt *alone*, but of what has its exiſtence *through faith*. Can Mr. T. ſuppoſe the apoſtle meant to ſay, we are juſtified through the *forgiveneſs of ſins*?

You argued farther from Chriſt's bearing the ſins of *many*, particularly from Iſai. liii. 12. And you ſuppoſed the meaning of the term *many* in verſe 12, might be decided by its meaning in verſe 11. "There is no reaſon," you obſerved, "that I know of, to be given, why the *many* whoſe ſins he bore, ſhould be underſtood of any other perſons than the *many* who *by his knowledge are juſtified*, and who are not all mankind." To this Mr. T. among other things, replies, "*I do not know*, is no argument at all. This may be ſaid on any ſubject. If the truth lie on the ſide of Mr. F. he muſt ſhew us that he *does* know, and *how* he knows it, by fair and allowed rules of interpretation."† This, to be ſure, is talking in a high ſtrain, but to what purpoſe? I ſhould have thought explaining of a term according to its allowed meaning in the context, *except ſome good reaſon could be given for the contrary*, was a fair and allowed rule of interpretation.

Again you argued from the *interceſſion* of Chriſt in John xvii. 9. *I pray for them, I pray not for the world*, &c. which, like that of the prieſts under the law, was in behalf of the ſame perſons for whom the oblation was offered. Mr. T. here, as uſual, calls out for more *proof*, without attending to what is given.* He queſtions two things, *firſt*, whether this prayer is to be conſidered as a ſpecimen of Chriſt's interceſſion, which he ſeems to conſider as confined to *heaven*, he means I ſuppoſe to

† xcvi. 97. * xcviii. 99.

to his ſtate of exaltation. But is not his prayer upon the croſs, expreſsly called in propheſy, *making* INTERCESSION *for the tranſgreſſors?* Iſai. liii 12. But farther, he calls for proof that the death and interceſſion of Chriſt are of equal extent.‡ The interceſſion of the prieſts under the law, being on the behalf of the ſame perſons on whoſe account they offered the oblation, was mentioned. Whether this be a *ſufficient* ground to reſt the argument upon, or not, one ſhould think it has *ſome* weight in it, but of this Mr. T. takes no notice.

Finally, you argued from Rev. v. 9. xiv. 3, 4. where Chriſtians are ſaid to be *redeemed* or *bought* from amongſt men, which ſhould ſeem to imply, that all men are not redeemed or bought. Mr. T. here goes about to refute ſome things which you built nothing upon.§ Whether the four living creatures, and the four and twenty elders, repreſent the church militant or the church triumphant; or whether the perſons in queſtion repreſent the *whole* church triumphant, or only *a part of it*, are matters that ſignify but little, if any thing, to the point in hand. If the whole, or a part of the church triumphant, were *bought*, or *redeemed by blood from amongſt men*, that is ſufficient. Mr. T. deals plentifully, I obſerve, in ſuch language as if you had uſed it, he would have held up in italics to great advantage, ſuch as "*I do not remember*—*I think*—and *I think*."—I do not mention this, as improper language, I only mean to remind him that he ſhould not have been ſo ſevere upon you for uſing the ſame. As to what he has ſaid upon this paſſage, I think upon the whole, it is as forcible as anything that can be ſaid on his ſide the queſtion; though it is certain the natural meaning of the word ηγορασθησαν, they were BOUGHT, and its only meaning, that I recollect, in the new teſtament, muſt be utterly caſhiered, and I apprehend the natural meaning of the whole paſſage greatly forced to admit of his interpretation.

I remain, dear ſir, Your's, &c.

‡ xcviii. 99. § c. ci. 101, 102.

P. S.

P. S. I do not recollect that the *whole world*, or *all*, or *all men*, are ever ſaid to be *purchaſed*, or *bought*, or *redeemed* by the blood of Chriſt, or that we ever read of Chriſt's *redeeming*, *buying*, or *purchaſing* any but *his church*. Mr. T. does not pretend that all mankind are *redeemed*; but I think if we take our notions from the new teſtament, it is evident that *buying*, or *purchaſing*, when applied to what Chriſt has done for us, is as much confined to the church as redemption. Αγοραζω and περιποιεω, which are uſed to expreſs the ideas of *buying*, *purchaſing*, or *acquiring by price*, are applied to the church of GOD only, as well as λυτροομαι to *redeem*, Luke xxiv. 21. Tit. ii. 14. and λυτρον a *ranſom*, Matt. xx. 28. Mark x. 45.—In 1 Tim. ii. 6. Chriſt is ſaid to give himſelf a ranſom for all, ανθιλυτρον υπερ παντων, but that will be conſidered in the next letter.——It is ſaid of *the church of* GOD, that he *purchaſed* it *with his own blood*. περιεποιησατο δια του ιδιου αιματος. Acts xx. 28. The final deliverance of the whole collective body of the ſaved, from all remains of natural and moral evil, is called, απολυτρωσις της περιποιησεως, the redemption of the *purchaſed poſſeſſion*, or of the *people acquired* or *purchaſed*. Eph. i. 14. On which *Calvin* remarks, περιποιησις, quam latine vertimus, *Acquiſitam hæreditatem*, non eſt regnum cœlorum aut beata immortalitas, ſed *ipſa Eccleſia*. Thus in 1 Pet. ii. 9. they are ſtiled, λαος εις περιποιησιν, a *people acquired*, or *purchaſed to himſelf in a peculiar manner*; or, a *people for a peculiar poſſeſſion*. Paul tells the Theſſalonians, 1ſt epiſt. v. 9. GOD hath not appointed *us* to wrath; but to the περιποιησιν σωτηριας *obtaining* or *acquiring* of ſalvation by our Lord Jeſus Chriſt, who died for us that we ſhould live with him. And 2d epiſt. ii. 13, 14. he ſays, Beloved of the Lord, GOD hath from the beginning choſen you to ſalvation, through ſanctification of the Spirit, and belief of the truth: whereunto he called you by our goſpel, unto περιποιησιν δοξης the *obtaining* or *acquiſition* of the glory of our Lord Jeſus Chriſt. Let the impartial judge if theſe paſſages do not ſtrongly favour the peculiarity of

of

of deſign in Chriſt's death. And thus it is ſaid of Chriſtians, τιμης ηγορασθητε, *ye are bought with a price*, 1 Cor. vi. 20. vii. 23.

If 2 Pet. ii. 1. ſhould be alledged as an objection, you have given a ſufficient reaſon in my opinion, why that paſſage is not to be underſtood of the Saviour's blood, but of God's deliverance in a way of providence, p. 89. It is ſuch a reaſon, however, as Mr. T. has not attempted to anſwer.

LETTER XII.

Dear Sir,

MR. T. in his ix Letters, offered arguments for the univerſal extent of Chriſt's death. He argued from the *goodneſs* of God over all his works, and from various paſſages of ſcripture which ſpeak of the death of Chriſt in indefinite language. The principal of theſe paſſages and arguments you have conſidered in your Reply. Mr. T. in the xith letter of his laſt publication, defends his former arguments.

Before I enter on a diſcuſſion of particulars, I would obſerve, though Mr. T. pleads for the univerſal extent of Chriſt's death, yet he pleads for it in no other ſenſe than as laying a foundation for ſinners without diſtinction, being invited to return home to God by Jeſus Chriſt, with the promiſe of forgiveneſs and acceptance on their return. He does not pretend that there is proviſion made by the death of Chriſt for the *certain* ſalvation of all men. Now the thing itſelf for which he pleads, is no more than you have admitted. It is true you have ſuppoſed, that this being done for men in general, cannot with propriety be called dying *for* them. At the ſame time you have allowed, that "many conſiderable writers, who are far from denying that the ſalvation of all the ſaved is owing to an abſolute, and conſequently limited deſign in the death of Chriſt, have ſuppoſed that it might; and that the indefinite

language of ſcripture concerning the death of Chriſt is intended to convey to us this idea." *Reply*, p. 79. The thing itſelf you do not controvert, only it appeared to you *that* the terms *ranſom, propitiation, dying for us*, &c. were intended to convey ſomething more than this, and what is true only of the finally ſaved. Now admitting that you are miſtaken in your ſuppoſition; admitting that the terms *propitiation, ranſom*, &c. are applicable to mankind in general, and are deſigned to expreſs that there is a way opened for ſinners without diſtinction to return home to GOD, and be ſaved; nothing follows from it, but that you have miſunderſtood certain paſſages of ſcripture, by conſidering them as conveying an indefinite but not an univerſal idea. In regard to the ſentiment itſelf, I do not ſee that Mr. T. pleads for more than you have admitted, except in one inſtance: you agree that a way is opened by the death of Chriſt for the ſalvation of ſinners without diſtinction, and that any man may be ſaved if he is willing to come to Chriſt that he may have life. Here you ſtop; but Mr. T. goes a ſtep farther, and maintains that ſuch a proviſion of grace is made by the death of Chriſt, that all men have power *to be willing if they will*; but of this I am ſatisfied no meaning can be made.

I now proceed to particulars, by obſerving, that whether your ſenſe of the paſſages of ſcripture adduced by Mr. T. be juſt or not, it does not appear to me, that Mr. T. has invalidated it. He argued in general from Pſ. cxlv. 9. *His tender mercies are over all his works.*—You anſwered that the death of Chriſt was not the criterion of GOD's goodneſs;—that fallen angels were a part of GOD's works as well as fallen men.—Mr. T. replies, by obſerving, that fallen angels were not here *intended*.† Then it ſeems Mr. T. can ſometimes diſcern a reſtriction in the word *all*, though an *univerſal* term. Perhaps it may be ſufficient to obſerve, that, whether the phraſe *all his works*, intends all fallen angels or not, it intends more than that part of GOD's works for which Chriſt died. Is it not evident from the

† cv. 106.

the context that it denotes GOD's providential goodneſs towards the whole animate creation? Is it not ſaid of them, in verſe 16, that *their eyes wait on* him; he *openeth his hand, and ſatisfieth the deſire of every living thing?*

But Mr. T. contends "that there is no *goodneſs*, no *mercy*, no *tender mercy* exerciſed towards a perſon who is placed in ſuch a ſituation that he could not avoid ſinning and being damned; and whoſe damnation is neceſſarily increaſed by calls and commands to repent and believe in Chriſt, when the great GOD, whoſe commands theſe are, has provided no mercy for him; nor intends to give him the leaſt aſſiſtance, though he knows the poor ſinner cannot, nor ever poſſibly could, obey theſe calls and commands any more than he can fly to the moon."† To this ſhocking repreſentation, I have only to ſay, this is *not your* hypotheſis, nor anything like it; and if Mr. T. thinks it is, it is time to give over controverting the matter with him. The whole paſſage is mere declamation, founded on the abuſe of the terms *cannot*, *could not*, &c. If inſtead of "*cannot* and *never could*," he had ſaid, *will not*, and *never would*, his account of the poor ſinners caſe would not have appeared ſo plauſible; and yet this, he knows, is the whole of our meaning. Yes, "but if they could never *will* to comply," ſays Mr. T. that amounts to the ſame thing.* That is, unleſs they have the power of being *willing*, *if they will*. Of this I ſhall only ſay, when Mr. T. can make ſenſe of it, it will be time enough to anſwer it.

What follows, has much more of argument in it.— "If the tender mercies of GOD are over all his works, and if no man can enjoy any mercy but through Jeſus Chriſt; is it not a natural and reaſonable concluſion, that GOD has given his Son to die for all mankind?‡ I muſt obſerve, however, by the way, that "if no *man* can enjoy any mercy but through Jeſus Chriſt," I cannot but conſider this as a full proof that the whole race were unworthy of all mercy, and that GOD might

 conſiſtently

† cv. 106. * lvi. 57. ‡ cv.

conſiſtently with his juſtice and eſſential goodneſs, have withheld it from them, and have treated them as worthy of death. For I have no idea that God needed the death of his Son to induce him to do *that*, which, if he had *not* done, the omiſſion of it would have expoſed him to the charge of cruelty. If Mr. T. had always remembered this conſideration, which I think he cannot controvert, it would have induced him to expunge a great deal of declamation in ſeveral parts of his letters. Having noted this, I confeſs I think much mercy is exerciſed towards men in general, through Jeſus Chriſt; and conſequently that his death was productive of effects which terminate on all. Nor do I queſtion whether the opening a way for the ſalvation of all who ſhall come unto God by him, and for men without diſtinction to be invited thus to come, is owing to the death of Chriſt; and if this can be called dying *for all* mankind, I ſhould admit that he died for all without heſitation. All I contend for is, that Chriſt in his death abſolutely deſigned the ſalvation of all thoſe who are finally ſaved; and that beſides the objects of ſuch abſolute deſign, ſuch is the univerſal depravity of human nature, not one ſoul will ever believe and be ſaved.

I am ſurprized at Mr. T.'s manner of treating your argument drawn from the objections that might be urged by a denier of God's foreknowledge; aſking whether you would ſeriouſly avow them?† One would think he need not be told, that you ſeriouſly diſapprove of that mode of reaſoning, as well as his; and only meant through that, to ſhew the tendency of his own. Such a mode of reaſoning is fair and upright, and is uſed by writers of every deſcription; it ought not therefore to have been called a *fineſſe*. Mr. T. in what he has ſaid on this ſubject, as in many other places, gives ſufficient proof of two things: *Firſt*, that he is combating a ſcheme which his opponent does not hold. *Secondly*, that it is to no purpoſe reaſoning with him upon ſuch terms as *cannot*, *unable*, or *unavoidable*, and the

† cvi. 107.

the like; for that he either cannot or will not underſtand our ideas concerning them.

Mr. T. now enters on a defence of his arguments from the terms *all men, world, whole world,* &c.* You apprehended, that to underſtand thoſe terms as denoting men *univerſally,* was contrary to other ſcriptures,—to the ſcope of the inſpired writers *in the places where theſe expreſſions are found,*—(ſuch, doubtleſs, was your meaning, and what you afterwards undertook to prove,) and involved in it various abſurdities. Mr. T. wiſhes you had given ſome inſtances of theſe contradictions and abſurdities. This you certainly attempted in a great deal of what followed, and ſummed them up in p. 109; which, though Mr. T. gives the name of "unreaſonable conſequences,"† he has never yet fairly refuted.

I paſs over ſome leſs important matters, and obſerve what is advanced from 1 Tim. ii. 6. *He gave himſelf a ranſom for all.* Mr. T. here complains, that you have not anſwered his reaſons for underſtanding the term *all* univerſally, and you might as well complain of him, for his not conſidering your reaſons for underſtanding it otherwiſe. He had argued, I remember,‖ from the uſe of the term *all* in the context, and the cogency of the apoſtle's argument, "pray for *all,* becauſe Chriſt "died for all." I cannot but think with Mr. *Robinſon,* that "this paſſage *ought not* to be urged in the *Arminian* "controverſy; for a part of this period fixes the ſenſe "to *ranks* or degrees of men. Pray for KINGS, and "for all that are IN AUTHORITY. The meaning, "then, is, pray for all *ranks* and degrees of men, for "GOD will ſave ſome of *all orders.*—Chriſt gave himſelf a ranſom for perſons of all *degrees.*"§ The arguments you had advanced‡ to prove that this paſſage could not be underſtood of men univerſally, he has not anſwered, but runs off into a declamation concerning the ſecret and revealed will of GOD, the

 ſubſtance

* cix. 110. † cxxxv. 136. ‖ ix Letters, 79.
§ Notes upon *Claude,* vol. ii. 269, 270. *Reply,* 82, 83.

ſubſtance of which you had ſufficiently obviated in your *Reply*. ‡

I think little more need be ſaid on 1 John ii. 1. What each of you has advanced upon it is before the public. Your ſenſe of the paſſage, which Mr. T. calls "a ſtrange notion," † ſurely is not more ſtrange or ſingular than *his* notion of *redemption*. He muſt produce ſome better proof for another ſenſe of the paſſage, than "appealing to the underſtanding and conſcience of *his friend*." * It is poſſible you may not think proper to join iſſue in an appeal to ſo partial a tribunal.

It is wonderful that Mr. T. ſhould plead for the *univerſal* ſpread of the goſpel in the times of the apoſtles, and for the faith of the Romans being celebrated *in all parts*. § In all parts of the Roman empire it might, and in ſome other nations; but can any man perſuade himſelf that it was ſpoken of at *Mexico* or *Otaheite*?

Mr. T. thinks that the *whole earth*, as mentioned in Iſa. liv. 5. is to be underſtood *univerſally*, and that God is there called the *God of the whole earth* as a creator, ſupporter and judge, in diſtinction from the tender character of an huſband. But as he is called both the *maker* and the *huſband* of the church there addreſſed; ſo it ſeems very evident he is deſcribed towards the *whole earth*. He who had heretofore been called *the Holy One of Iſrael*, ſhall now be called the *God of the whole earth*. See *Henry's* expoſition.

The term *whole*, in Matt. xiii. 33, undoubtedly is to be underſtood reſtrictively; for though the goſpel will ſpread over all nations before the end of the world, yet not

‡ Note, 95--97. † cxiv. 115.

* It may not be inexpedient to inform ſome readers, that Mr. T.'s letters were written to an old and intimate friend of *his own*, who entirely agrees with him in ſentiment, and at whoſe requeſt Mr. T. firſt commenced this controverſy; though as that gentleman had ſome ſlight acquaintance with Mr. Fuller, Mr. T. all along ſpeaks to him of Mr. F. as the friend of his correſpondent.

§ cxv. 116.

not ſo as to renew every individual in them, much leſs every individual that has exiſted at every period.†

Mr. T. is aſtoniſhed to find you aſſerting that he himſelf does not underſtand the terms whole world in 1 John ii. 2. and the ſame terms in chap. v. 19. in the ſame ſenſe, ſeeing he has declared the contrary.† Perhaps you had better have ſaid, Mr. T. *cannot upon due conſideration*, underſtand thoſe terms as parallel, ſeeing he conſiders them in the firſt as meaning all the individuals in the world *that ever did or ſhall exiſt* in it, except the perſons from whom they are there diſtinguiſhed; whereas he cannot pretend the laſt to mean any more than the world of ungodly men who *at that time* exiſted. For my part, I am as much aſtoniſhed at him for profeſſing to conſider them as parallel, as he can be at you for your aſſertion.

Another paſſage that has been conſidered by both of you, is 2 Cor. v. 15. *If one died for all, then were all dead*, &c.‡ Mr. T. here complains, as he does in various other places, of your not drawing your concluſions in form. I ſuppoſe you thought the concluſions you meant to draw were obvious to every attentive reader, and omitted drawing them out at length for the ſake of brevity. You obſerved (1.) The context ſpeaks of the *Gentiles* being intereſted in Chriſt as well as the Jews. You ſuppoſed therefore it might be underſtood of men of *all nations*, in diſtinction from its being confined to the Jews. (2.) That the apoſtle meant to affirm, *not* that Chriſt died for all that were dead, *but* that all were dead for whom Chriſt died. In proof of this, you argued from the apoſtle's deſcribing the *terrors* of divine vengeance to which they were ſubject; and the phraſeology of verſe 14. If one died for all, then were *they* all dead. For this Mr. T. has corrected you, charging you with miſquoting the ſcripture. The words of the apoſtle are, ὅτι εἰ εἷς ὑπὲρ πάντων ἀπέθανεν, ἄρα οἱ πάντες ἀπέθανον. You not having had thoſe advantages for literary improvement

† cxvi. 117. ‡ cxvii. 118.

provement which you would have been glad to enjoy, were not forward by a formal criticiſm, to tell your readers that you had acquired ſome ſmall acquaintance with the original language, ſo as to be able to judge of the propriety of a tranſlation, but you knew that the article οι here uſed, has been thought by very competent judges,* to be anaphorical, or relative, and that the paſſage ſhould be read, *If one for all died, then* THEY *all*, or THOSE *all, were dead.* Nothing can be more exact than this tranſlation, unleſs Mr. T. would inſiſt on having οι παντες απεθανον rendered THE *all were dead*; and then he muſt equally complain of our common tranſlators, for rendering οι ζωντες in the next verſe, *they who live*, inſtead of THE *living*. But would not Mr. T. be aſhamed to inſinuate on this account, to "the inattentive reader," that they have "interlined and abuſed" the original language of ſcripture. I am ſo well aſſured of Mr. T.'s learning, that I am hardly able to conſider his "hope" that you quoted the paſſage wrong "through miſtake," as any other than "a *fineſſe*." (3.) You obſerved on the diſtributive *they who*, that your hypotheſis, though it ſuppoſes all for whom Chriſt died ſhall finally live, yet does not ſuppoſe that they all live *at preſent*. Here, I think, Mr. T. certainly miſunderſtands you. His original argument *is this*, by the language of the text it appears that Chriſt died for more than actually live. Your anſwer is, that upon *your* hypotheſis, Chriſt died for more than actually live at any period of time, part of them being at every period in a ſtate of unregeneracy.

I have gone over the paſſages in debate between you, merely to prove that whether your ſenſe of thoſe paſſages be juſt or not, Mr. T. has not invalidated it. At the ſame time I cannot forbear repeating, that even allowing Mr. T. to have proved the univerſal extent of Chriſt's death in the moſt forcible manner, he has not proved that any thing more is done towards the ſalvation of men in general than what you admit, or that renders the ſalvation of *one* individual more *probable*. You have

* *Beza*, *Piſcator*, and *Gill*. See GILL's *Cauſe of God and Truth*. Part I. N° xxxix.

have all along ſuppoſed, that there *is that* done for them by Chriſt, which renders their ſalvation no otherwiſe *impoſſible*, nor their deſtruction *unavoidable*, than as it is rendered ſo, by their own temper of mind; no other obſtacle could prevent their believing to the ſaving of their ſouls, but an evil heart, obſtinately perſiſting in its departure from the living GOD.

Mr. T. ſums up his evidence on this ſubject in *five* topics of argument. The ſilence of ſcripture on the limited extent of Chriſt's death;—the willingneſs of the bleſſed GOD that all ſhould turn and live;—thoſe who are not ſaved being more miſerable than if Chriſt had not died;—the unlimited expreſſions uſed concerning the death of Chriſt;—and ſuch paſſages as diſtinguiſh between thoſe for whom he died, and thoſe who are finally ſaved.*

With regard to the *firſt*, the bible is *not* ſilent concerning a *ſpecial deſign* in the death of Chriſt, as in all the other works of GOD, in behalf of all who are finally ſaved. I hope this has been proved in letter x^th^ and xi^th^, and in your *Reply*, 66--76.—It is true, there are no ſuch expreſs words, that I know of, in the bible; but if the idea is there conveyed that is ſufficient. Mr. T. ſays indeed, that "if a doctrine is not *mentioned* in ſcripture, there is good reaſon to believe that doctrine is not true—that we admit this on all other ſubjects, and ought to admit it on this." But ſo far is this from being fact, that we never find *expreſs mention* of a *divine providence*, and yet we all allow the ſcripture to be full of it. Reaſoning from poſitive inſtitutions to doctrines, as Mr. T. does,‡ is very unfair.

Mr. T.'s *ſecond* topic of argument is taken from the univerſality of divine love to man, and the willingneſs of the bleſſed GOD that all ſhould turn and live. It is admitted that GOD's love to man is in one ſenſe univerſal. He bears good will towards them as the work of his hands; but it does not follow from thence that

* cxviii. 120. ‡ cviii. 109.

that he muſt do all that he could do for their ſalvation. If God loves all mankind, he muſt have loved the inhabitants of *Tyre*, *Sidon*, and *Sodom*, as well as thoſe of *Chorazin* and *Bethſaida*: but though, as Mr. T. thinks,* if the ſame things which were done for the latter without effect, had been done for the former, they would have been effectual, yet they were not done.—As to God's willingneſs that all ſhould turn and live, God's will, as you have obſerved,† ſometimes expreſſes what he *approves*, and ſometimes what he *purpoſes*. God wills, approves, and deſires a ſinner's turning unto him. It is that which through the whole bible is required of him; and whoſoever thus returns ſhall live. I may add, God is willing to receive and forgive every ſinner that returns to him through Jeſus Chriſt. He deſireth not the death of a ſinner, but rather that he would repent and live. But he has *not purpoſed* the ſalvation of every ſinner, or to incline his heart to embrace the ſalvation exhibited in the goſpel. In this ſenſe, the ſalvation of ſome is neither *deſired* nor *deſigned*; if it were, it would be *effected*, for his *counſel ſhall ſtand*, and he *will do all* his *pleaſure*. *Whatſoever his ſoul deſireth, even that he doeth.* Iſai. xlvi. 10. Job xxiii. 13.—"But can God," ſays Mr. T. "will that which he knows to be *impoſſible?* which *never was poſſible?* which *none could make poſſible* beſides himſelf? which he was *never willing* to make poſſible?‖ If by *impoſſible*, Mr. T. means, that which is *naturally* impoſſible, it is granted he cannot. But that he wills what is *morally* impoſſible, Mr. T. himſelf muſt allow. God wills that Chriſtians ſhould be holy as he himſelf is holy, and that in the preſent life, or he would not have enjoined it upon them. 1 Pet. iv. 16. Matt. v. 48. But Mr. T. does not pretend that this is poſſible, even by the aſſiſtance of divine grace.‡

Mr. T.'s *third* topic of argument is thus expreſſed, "All who are not ſaved will be more miſerable than if Chriſt had never died for ſinners.—If Chriſt did not die for them, they cannot, nor ever could poſſibly avoid this.

* xxiii. 25. † Reply, 96. note. ‖ cxix. 120. ‡ lx. 61.

this.—This cannot be reconciled to the ſcripture account of divine juſtice and goodneſs."* Anſwer. (1.) This can only be ſaid of *thoſe* who have *heard* the *goſpel* and *rejected* it, and not of "all who are not ſaved," that they will be more miſerable than if Chriſt had never died. Suppoſing this argument, therefore, to be valid, it will not prove that Chriſt in laying down his life deſigned the ſalvation of all men univerſally, but merely of thoſe to whom the goſpel is exhibited. (2.) It is no way inconſiſtent with the juſtice or goodneſs of GOD, to ſuffer good to be the *occaſion* of evil. The goſpel was preached to the unbelieving Jews, even after it was ſaid of them, "Hearing they ſhall hear, and not underſtand; and ſeeing they ſhall ſee, and not perceive," and became the occaſion of much ſin and miſery. Matt. xiii. 14.—But, they *might* have embraced the goſpel when it was *firſt* preached to them, if they would—True, and at *laſt* too, or it had been abſurd to have preached it to them. There was nothing that hindered their believing firſt or laſt, but their own wicked hearts.—On that account they *could not* believe. John xii. 39. Yet Chriſt at the very time this was declared, exhorted them, *While* they had *light*, to *believe in the light, that* they might *be the children of light*, ver. 36; and their contempt of his counſel aggravated their miſery.

Mr. T.'s *fourth* topic of argument is taken from "the *expreſſions* of ſcripture, where the extent of Chriſt's death is directly mentioned, being all univerſal and unlimited." Something has been ſaid in your *Reply* to *Philanthropos*,† that accounts for theſe indefinite modes of ſpeech; ſomething too, which Mr. T. I think, has not ſufficiently anſwered. But ſuppoſe it were allowed, as hath been ſaid before, that the language of ſcripture, taken in its moſt literal and plain meaning, proves Chriſt in ſome ſenſe to have died for all mankind, ſtill if we will give fair ſcope to other parts of ſcripture, it is evident, that in ſome ſenſe, he died only for a part. Theſe ſcriptures have been conſidered

* cxix. 120. † 80, 81.

conſidered in letter x^th, and in your *Reply* to *Philanthropos*. 66--76.

Laſtly, Mr. T. obſerves, that "ſeveral paſſages evidently diſtinguiſh between thoſe for whom Chriſt died, and thoſe who will be finally ſaved."† The paſſages to which he refers, are, John iii. 16. "GOD ſo loved the *world* that he gave his only begotten Son, that *whoſoever* believeth in him ſhould not periſh, but have everlaſting life." And Matt. xxii. 1--11. concerning the marriage-feaſt, and proviſion being made for thoſe who did not come. With John vi. 32. "My Father *giveth you* the true bread from heaven; which, as he obſerves, was ſpoken to the Jews *in general*, without reſtriction.‡

Theſe paſſages prove, that there is *that* in the death of Chriſt which lays a foundation for any ſinner to apply to GOD in his name, and that with an aſſurance of ſucceſs. But this is no more than you have admitted. In the invitations of the goſpel being general you both agree, and alſo in a proviſion of pardon and acceptance on behalf of all who believe; and that therefore there is no impoſſibility in the way of men's ſalvation, but what conſiſts in the temper of their own minds. But this does not diſprove either the *reality* or *neceſſity* of an *effectual* proviſion of grace, in behalf of *All* who are finally ſaved.

I conclude this letter, with recommending it to Mr. T. to conſider whether his ſcheme is not inconſiſtent with *fact*. If I underſtand him, he ſuppoſes, that "final miſery" comes not upon any of the ſons of men, "by their original depravity, nor by their tranſgreſſion of the law, but by their rejection of the overtures of mercy." Hence he ſuppoſes, "All who are not ſaved will be more miſerable than if Chriſt had never died for ſinners."* Though the above expreſſions might be conſidered as meant only of thoſe ſinners who hear the goſpel, yet his ſubſequent reaſonings indicate

† cxx. 121. ‡ ix Lett. 83.
* ix Letters, 86. and xiii Letters, cxix. 120.

indicate that he viewed it as applicable to all mankind. He ſpeaks all along as if our Saviour had not only died for the whole world, but as *if the whole world had heard the goſpel*, and as if none could periſh conſiſtently with the juſtice and goodneſs of GOD, but for their rejection of it. Thus he goes on, bearing all down before him. "If Chriſt died for *all*, theſe reaſons for their final condemnation and miſery, are all perfectly clear and eaſy; becauſe the proviſion being made for them, (i.e. for *all*) AND EXHIBITED TO THEM, (i.e. to *all*) they could not periſh unleſs by rejection of that proviſion. Difficulty and inconſiſtency is all removed."† This is talking at a high rate. Thus many a writer, as well as Mr. T. has ſat in his ſtudy and formed a theory, and delighted himſelf with its excellency. But bring it to *experience* and *fact*.—Is it FACT that the proviſion of the goſpel has been, or is, "exhibited to all?" Mr. T.'s ſyſtem requires that it ſhould, and he ſeems to wiſh to take it for granted that it actually has; but *facts* contradict it.

I have never ſeen any tolerable anſwer to this argument. The only one that I have ſeen, you have conſidered in your *Reply to Philanthropos*,* to which I wiſh Mr. T. had given an anſwer.

I am, dear ſir,

Your's, affectionately, &c.

LETTER XIII.

Dear Sir,

THERE is doubtleſs an analogy between the works of GOD. Whatever variety there is in the works of creation, providence, or redemption, there are ſome general principles, wherein they all agree. On this ſuppoſition you argued for the conſiſtency of ſinners being exhorted and invited to return home to

† ix Letters, 87. * Note, 105--107.

God by Jeſus Chriſt, though no *ſuch* proviſion be made for their return as ſhall remove their moral inability to comply. Thus, or to this effect, you have expreſſed it in your *Reply*, p. 90.* Mr. T. here complains of the *darkneſs* of your reaſoning.‡ How far this is juſt I ſhall not decide; but this is pretty evident, that there muſt have been darkneſs ſomewhere, or there could not have been ſuch anſwers given as there are.

You argued in the *firſt* place from the appointment of God reſpecting the time of human life.—Men are exhorted to uſe means for prolonging their lives; and yet the time of their life is appointed of God; and ſome of them, as king *Saul* and *Judas* for inſtance, have been under the dominion of a *moral impotency* in regard to preſerving life. They were given up of God to their own wickedneſs, like thoſe who *cannot ceaſe from* ſin; and it was the purpoſe of a juſt God, for reaſons ſatisfactory to himſelf, thus to give them up.

But Mr. T. aſks, "ſuppoſing God has fixed the duration of every man's life, has he appointed (he ſhould have ſaid *exhorted*) men to uſe means to prolong their lives beyond that duration?"† If ſelf-preſervation is a duty, and if God at all times exhorts us to exerciſe it, then it undoubtedly was the duty of *Saul*, *Ahitophel*, and *Judas*, to have uſed means, to prolong their lives beyond the period which they actually lived. The former, and his armour-bearer, *ought* to have avoided the ſword, and the latter the rope.—"But has God told us that we ſhall certainly die at the time he has appointed, if we do not uſe the means of prolonging life?"—If I underſtand this queſtion, it is intended to deny that the time of man's life is appointed of God, any otherwiſe than on condition of their uſing means. Doubtleſs he that has appointed the end, has appointed the

* You did not undertake to prove, as Mr. T. expreſſes it, "the conſiſtency of goſpel invitations where *no* proviſion is made." xiii Lett. cxxiv. 125. You admitted a proviſion, and explained in what ſenſe you admitted it. *Reply*, 89, 90.

‡ cxxiii. 124. † cxxv. 126.

the means; and Mr. T. ſhould remember he had juſt admitted the appointment to be abſolute, and profeſſed now to be reaſoning upon that ſuppoſition.—But "has he aſſured us that all the means we uſe ſhall certainly ſucceed?" No, he has not; but I do not ſee wherein this difference between the caſe in hand and the call of the goſpel, affects the argument.—But "if we die at the time GOD has appointed, does he charge that to our account, and ſay it was becauſe we did not uſe means to prolong our lives? Certainly he does not lay his own appointments to our charge; but he may lay the time and manner of our death, and puniſh us for them, ſo far as they were owing to our ſin, even though he hath appointed to give us up to that ſin. This was true of *Saul* and *Judas*, who ought to have uſed means to live longer than they did, and expoſed themſelves to future puniſhment for uſing the contrary.—But "does the Great GOD declare and ſwear that he would not have us die naturally, at the time when he has abſolutely appointed that we ſhould die? Does he ſay we *might live longer if we would?* that he has called us to live longer; and if we do not, it is becauſe we *will not?*" Mr. T. ſhould remember you were not reaſoning from the caſe of thoſe who "die naturally," but from the caſe of ſuch who through their own ſin, "come to what is called an untimely end," as did Saul and Judas; and in theſe inſtances each of his queſtions may be anſwered in the affirmative. And a ſimilar inſtance we have in the caſe of thoſe *Jews* who died *by the ſword, by the famine, and by the peſtilence*, in conſequence of their refuſal to ſubmit to the yoke of Nebuchadnezzar, Jerem. xxvii. 13: which caſe I would alſo recommend to the cloſe attention of the *Pſeudo Calviniſts*, as well as to Mr. *Taylor's*.

You argued in the *ſecond* place, from the appointments of GOD reſpecting *our portion in this life*.—Men are exhorted and invited to ſeek after thoſe good things, and to avoid thoſe evil things, which yet many of them are morally unable to purſue, or to avoid, and GOD has appointed to leave them in this caſe to their own negli-

gence and depravity.* Mr. T.'s queſtions under this head,† as under the former, are not in point. The queſtion is not whether *all* troubles ariſe from indiſcretion or any particular ſin of the party; if any do, that is ſufficient for your argument. If there are troubles which might be avoided *if we would*, and if it is the revealed will of GOD that we ſhould avoid them, that is ſufficient. Pharaoh and Sihon were exhorted and invited to comply with the meſſages of peace that were ſent them; and yet they were under the dominion of a moral impotency to comply; and GOD had appointed to leave them to the hardneſs of their hearts, in which they periſhed and involved themſelves in ruin.

Nor is it in point for Mr. T. to alledge that "no directions are given in ſcripture, with encouragements and promiſes annexed, which the Great GOD does not give *power* to practiſe, and with regard to which, he has not provided ſuch a *ſufficiency*, as that the practice invariably anſwers the ends deſigned by it, according to the tenor of the directions, and promiſes or encouragements connected with them."‡ All this is granted, both in reſpect to the things of this life, and that to come too, and is no more than what perfectly accords with your views of the goſpel. You never ſuppoſed but that *Pharaoh* and *Sihon* had *power*, ſtrictly ſpeaking, to comply with the meſſages that were ſent them, or that there would have been any want of *ſufficiency* on GOD's part, to have made good his promiſes in caſe they had complied.

You argued in the *third* place from *events which imply the evil actions of men* coming under divine appointment. —The Jews, in the time of Chriſt, were exhorted and invited to embrace the goſpel; and yet they were under the

* Admitting that in ſome ſenſe Chriſt is given to the world in general, yet you ſuppoſe it is in the ſame ſenſe in which *the earth is* ſaid to be *given to the children of men*, Pſ. cxv. 16. in which general gift, GOD ſtill reſerves to himſelf the power of diſpoſing in a way of ſpecial providence, of all its particular parts to particular perſons, even to ſuch a degree, that every individual has a *cup* aſſigned him to drink, a *lot* which providence marks out for him.

† cxxvi. 127. ‡ cxxvii. 128.

the dominion of a moral impotency to comply, and it appears from many paſſages of ſcripture which you have cited, that GOD had determined not to turn their hearts, but to give them over to their own ways, which would certainly iſſue in the crucifixion of Chriſt and their own deſtruction.—As Jehovah had ſaid long before, to their forefathers in the days of Jeremiah, *Be thou inſtructed, O Jeruſalem, leſt my ſoul depart from thee*; while yet the prophet ſays immediately after, reſpecting thoſe very perſons, *To whom ſhall I ſpeak and give warning that they may hear? behold their ear is uncircumciſed, and they* CANNOT *hearken.*" Jer. vi. 8, 10.—So our Lord remarked to his diſciples, *Unto you it is given to know the myſtery of the kingdom of* GOD: *but unto them that are without, all things are done in parables; that ſeeing, they may ſee, and not perceive, and hearing they may hear, and not underſtand; leſt at any time they ſhould be converted, and* their *ſins ſhould be forgiven them.* Mark iv. 11, 12.—Thus of the ſame perſons to whom the bleſſed Jeſus had ſaid, *While ye have light believe in the light, that ye may be the children of light*; it is added immediately, *But though he had done ſo many miracles before them, yet they believed not on him: that the ſaying of Iſaiah the prophet might be fulfilled, which he ſpake, Lord, who hath believed our report, and to whom hath the arm of the Lord been revealed? Therefore they* COULD NOT *believe, becauſe that Iſaiah had ſaid again, He hath blinded their eyes, and hardened their heart; that they ſhould not ſee with their eyes, nor underſtand with their heart, and be converted, and I ſhould heal them.* John xii. 36--40.

Mr. T. will ſay, " but they might have had grace *before* that time."—Be that as it may, it makes nothing to the argument. They were exhorted and invited *at the time* in which it was declared they *could not believe.*

You ſuppoſe GOD hath willed, appointed or ordained to permit ſin. Mr. T. is not fond of ſaying that GOD doth permit ſin. I ſuppoſe he would not object to the term *ſuffer*, which is applied to the exiſtence of moral evil. Acts xiv. 16. He *ſuffered* all nations to walk in their own ways; and the term *permit*, as any Engliſh dictionary

dictionary will inform us, conveys the ſame idea, "to ſuffer without authorizing or approving," which is the only ſenſe in which we uſe it on this ſubject; though the word is ſometimes uſed in a different ſignification, as "to allow by not forbidding." Mr. T.'s notions of what is neceſſary to *free-agency*, I have already conſidered in the beginning of letter the third.

Your *next* topic of argument is taken from thoſe who had ſinned the ſin againſt the Holy Spirit, being notwithſtanding exhorted to embrace the Lord Jeſus:—from whence you conclude that ſuch exhortations and invitations were addreſſed to ſome men, whom, at the ſame time, ſtrictly ſpeaking, "it was not the intention of Chriſt to ſave." Mr. T.'s anſwer to this is foreign from the point. He "hopes Mr. F. will not aſſert, thoſe who ſin againſt the Holy Spirit do it *neceſſarily*, and never were, or could be able to avoid it, either by our own power, or by the power of divine grace."* How they came to ſin that ſin, is not the queſtion. You did not argue from what they were *before*, or at the time, but from their ſtate after having committed that ſin. His accounting for the conſiſtency of goſpel invitations being addreſſed to them after they had ſinned the unpardonable ſin, by alledging, that proviſion *had been* made for them, though now "they had ſinned themſelves beyond the reach of it,"† is equally foreign. To argue that it is conſiſtent to give an exhortation or invitation *to day*, becauſe grace might have been obtained yeſterday, is abſurd. If the goſpel and its invitations were addreſſed to them, when their deſtruction was certain, then it is not inconſiſtent to addreſs thoſe invitations even to men who, as it may afterwards prove, were at the very time, as the juſt reward

* cxxviii. 129. It is to very little purpoſe to controvert with Mr. T. ſo long as he is determined to affix ideas to terms which we utterly diſavow. It is plain that by *neceſſarily* he means *by compulſion*, or in ſuch ſort as they were not *able* to avoid, let them ſtrive ever ſo ſincerely againſt it. He need not queſtion your denying that the ſin againſt the Holy Spirit, or any other ſin, could be committed in this way. Our idea of *moral neceſſity* is no other than that of *certainty*, or a certain connection between evil principles and evil practices, unleſs prevented by ſome exterior cauſe. † cxxix. 130.

reward of their iniquity, appointed to utter deſtruction. The indefinite call of the goſpel including them as well as others, and the declaration of our Lord, *Him that cometh to me I will in no wiſe caſt out*, holding good in regard to them as well as any others; it might be ſaid with truth, that there was no *natural* impoſſibility in the way of their ſalvation,—that if they had repented, they would have found mercy. But the impoſſibility reſpected their being brought to repentance. Heb. vi. 4, 6. They were under the power of a *moral impotence*, or, which is the ſame thing, of a rooted enmity to Chriſt, and GOD had determined to leave them in that ſtate to periſh for their ſin.

You argued in the *next* place from the *moral impotence* of all men to *love GOD with all their hearts*, and their *neighbour as themſelves*:—which yet we are exhorted to. Deut. v. 29. Matt. v. 48. "Perhaps," Mr. T. ſays, "theſe premiſes might be fairly diſputed."† That they might be diſputed is true, but ſurely not by Mr. T. He does not profeſs that grace is provided ſufficient to enable men to keep the law, but barely to comply with the goſpel.‡ And ſurely he cannot diſpute our being exhorted to it; what meaning elſe is there in the above-cited paſſages? "But admitting the premiſes," ſays Mr. T. "ſurely Mr. *Fuller* will allow that GOD *originally* gave man power ſufficient to keep the moral law, otherwiſe how could man be juſtly condemned for breaking it?" True, but what has the *original* power given to man to do with the argument, which concerns men in their preſent ſtate? They are *now* exhorted to love GOD with all their hearts; and yet they are under a moral inability to comply; and grace is not provided to enable them to comply. Compare *Deut.* v. 29, with xxix. 4.—Theſe are facts, and facts that are in point too. The difference between the law and the goſpel, on which Mr. T. dwells, makes nothing to his purpoſe. The above facts will prove that a *moral ability*, which men either poſſeſs or might poſſeſs, is not neceſſary to render exhortations conſiſtent.

Mr.

† cxxix. 130. ‡ lx. 61.

Mr. T.'s argument from the power that was given man originally to keep the law, for a power in men to comply with the goſpel, is very juſt, provided it be underſtood of *power* properly ſo called, namely, a *capacity to embrace it, if they would.* But if by power he means *inclination*, as he muſt if it is of any uſe to him, that is quite another thing. GOD is under no obligation to turn men's hearts, in order to free his meſſages to them from inconſiſtency.

Laſtly, you argued from the *certain perſeverance of believers.* This ſubject, if Mr. T. admits it, muſt contradict his notion of a certain and effectual influence upon the mind being inconſiſtent with free agency.† And will prove that an abſolute purpoſe in GOD to accompliſh an end, is conſiſtent with the uſe of means, motives, warnings, counſels, &c. But I confeſs I demur on its being a proper ground on which to found an argument relative to the point in hand. I ſhall therefore paſs it by without any farther remarks.

What remains of Mr. T.'s performance has either been occaſionally noticed already, or is of ſuch a nature as not to require an anſwer. He drops ſeveral remarks towards the cloſe of his piece, that are very good, in which I heartily unite with him. I ſhall not, like him, however, conclude with anything like "*noiſe*" or "triumph," on account of the folly of the world;‡ but in his good will, and good wiſhes, I would cordially unite. Whatever I may think of his ſentiments, my good opinion of Mr. T.'s integrity and piety is not leſſened by this controverſy; and from what I know of you, I can anſwer for the ſame in reſpect of your's. Heartily deſiring that every divine bleſſing may attend us all, and that we may each be led into the truth as it is in Jeſus, I remain, dear ſir,

Affectionately your's,

7 AP 66 AGNOSTOS.

† cxxviii. 129. ‡ cxlii. 145.

FINIS.